Nonprofit doesn't mean no profit, FIFA's FFE plan shows
The plan that vanished in four days
On July 28th, FIFA announced a plan for a new company called “FIFA Forward Enterprise (FFE).” Commercial rights and tournament operations for the men’s and women’s World Cups and the Club World Cup would move to it, valued at $20 billion, with about 20% to be sold to private investors. The lead investor named was Thrive Eternal, launched by Joshua Kushner in April 2026. Member associations were given until September 19th to respond.
According to the UK’s The Times, if Chairman Infantino took the top job at the new company, his compensation would be more than ten times his current pay.
In the early hours of August 1st, FIFA withdrew the plan. “We will not be proceeding with this proposal.” Four days after the announcement.
What caught my attention wasn’t the compensation figure. FIFA is a nonprofit association under Swiss law. It’s supposed to be an organization that doesn’t exist to generate profit. So how could a story about an individual’s pay rising tenfold even arise?
There’s a second question too. Why was the plan withdrawn?
Last time, I wrote about how far a person’s own traits can account for an extreme outcome. The conclusion was that traits are a necessary condition, not a sufficient one. This continues that argument. It’s about what determines what a person does once they’ve cleared the necessary condition and taken the seat.
I’ll set aside judgments of right and wrong and walk through the mechanism in order.
Let me state the conclusion up front.
The nonprofit form doesn’t prohibit generating profit. It prohibits distributing it to outsiders. So the profit doesn’t disappear. It turns into non-monetary perks — insider discretion, prestige, privileges — and that’s where things get mired.
Here’s a second point. If no one outside receives a share, no one outside keeps score of gains and losses either. People with a motive to monitor the organization structurally cease to exist.
These two points explain why the plan emerged. They don’t explain why it was withdrawn. So at the end, I’ll have to correct my own framework.
What “nonprofit” prohibits is distribution, not generation
The starting point is Hansmann’s (1980) nondistribution constraint. It’s a foundational text in nonprofit organization theory, still cited more than forty years later.
The definition is simple. A nonprofit organization is prohibited from distributing surplus to those who control it — not from generating surplus in the first place.
FIFA holds a monopoly position. There is no substitute for the World Cup. So a surplus arises — a surplus born from a position shielded from competition itself, what economists call rent. FIFA’s own announcement projects revenue of $15 billion for the 2026 tournament.
So where does that surplus go? There are no shareholders, so it can’t become dividends. The naive assumption is that it simply vanishes here. In practice it changes form.
Glaeser & Shleifer (2001) and Glaeser (2003) lay this out. In organizations with no residual claimant, surplus tends to be captured by insiders — not as cash, but as discretion, prestige, organizational expansion, and perquisites. Niskanen’s budget-maximizing bureaucrat model has the same structure.
In other words, the nonprofit form was only ever restricting how the share got taken — to non-monetary form.
Seen this way, FFE comes into focus. It was a device for lifting the nondistribution constraint and converting non-monetary shares into cash.
It isn’t only about money, either. Under FIFA’s statutes, Chairman Infantino has one term remaining. CBS has written that the seat atop the new company looked like a way to create a “commissioner”-type position extending beyond 2031. Term limits are a deadline attached to the non-monetary share. Set up a company, and that deadline comes off too.
Monitoring can only be done from outside
Now to confirm the second point from the opening: no outside beneficiary means no monitor.
Pielke Jr. (2013), in Sport Management Review, goes through accountability mechanisms for FIFA one by one and knocks each down. The state (only reached by Swiss association law), the market, sponsors, member associations, the media. The conclusion: there are almost no means of holding FIFA accountable.
Mapping it onto a corporation makes this easier to see. Member associations sit closer to employees or directors. They’re assigned work inside the organization, allotted budgets, and their livelihoods ride on that allotment. If something seems wrong, they can raise their voice. They can even object at a meeting. But the place where they raise that voice is a place built by the other party.
Outside shareholders are different. They hold a bundle of claims — voting rights, access to the books, derivative suits, and the freedom to sell their shares. That last one is what bites. If shares get sold, the price falls, and management’s necks are put in real danger. Only someone who is outside, and still holds a concrete claim, can shake the power structure.
FIFA has no one occupying that outside-shareholder position. In structural terms: a joint-stock company’s residual claims are transferable, so if management deteriorates the company can be bought out. A nonprofit association has nothing like that. The discipline imposed by a market for corporate control is zero.
In fact, the only actors who have ever actually reached FIFA were foreign criminal authorities operating through an entirely different hook. The 2015 US Department of Justice indictment used dollar clearing and RICO as a detour. Switzerland also moved, but both the 2014 PEP designation and the criminalization of private bribery that took effect in July 2016 were legislation enacted after the events had already happened.
This is as far as the explanation for why the plan emerged goes. There’s a share to be had, and no monitor outside. So the proposal could arise.
The arithmetic of buying 211 votes
So what kind of person ends up at the top of an organization like this?
FIFA runs on one association, one vote. 211 associations. Spain and San Marino carry the same single vote. Winning a majority in a presidential election takes 106 votes, and those 106 votes can be assembled with no relation to population or competitive strength.
Political science’s selectorate theory (Bueno de Mesquita et al.) predicts the optimal strategy under this design. When a winning coalition can be bought cheaply, a leader sustains the coalition not with public goods (quality of competition, governance) but with private goods (development funds).
The figures presented this time check out exactly against that prediction. According to reports, associations that backed FFE were offered £30.1 million each, roughly $40 million. Current FIFA Forward allocations are reportedly on the order of $8 million over four years.
The model’s prediction and the number actually put on the table line up. Anyone can verify this from the same reporting.
There’s also research specific to FIFA. Geeraert (2018) frames corruption in international sports federations not as a “bad apples” problem but as a “bad barrels” problem — the claim is that it’s generated by structure, not people. Gibel, Überbacher & Scherer (2026) go further, tracking FIFA longitudinally from 2016 to 2024 and analyzing how anti-corruption reforms were rolled back. It’s a study not of “until self-correction kicks in” but of “the process by which self-correction gets dismantled.”
Being unbothered by being disliked means a constraint has come off
Now back to the question of compensation.
Separate from optimal-contracting theory, there’s Bebchuk & Fried’s (2004) managerial-power approach to executive pay. On this view, compensation is set not by the market or the board but by the executive’s own bargaining power, with the ceiling set by “the cost of public outrage.” They called this the outrage constraint.
Under this framework, someone insensitive to backlash can extract more, precisely because the constraint is looser for them.
Still, I want to keep the logic precise. Shamelessness isn’t a sufficient condition. It’s a condition that loosens the constraint. It only takes effect once a share already exists (the nondistribution constraint) and monitoring is absent (the accountability gap). Only once all three are in place does a difference in character become a difference in dollar amount.
This takes the same shape as last time. Traits do their work at the necessary-condition stage. It’s structure that fills the gap left by the sufficient condition.
The part my own framework missed
Up to here, I’ve explained why the plan emerged. But I can’t explain the withdrawal.
The straightforward prediction from this framework was: “Even if member associations object, it’s only talk, so it won’t survive until the next general assembly.” In fact it ended in four days. The prediction missed.
I want to be clear about why it missed. I had assumed member associations held no exit card — that withdrawing from the World Cup was effectively not an option for them.
But UEFA’s 55 associations agreed on Thursday to boycott FIFA-run tournaments. The AFC, CONCACAF, and CONMEBOL also came out in opposition.
This isn’t voice. It’s exit.
And this exit is stronger than a shareholder’s “sell.” When a shareholder sells, the company can keep making its product. When member associations withdraw, the product itself — the World Cup — can no longer be made. They were simultaneously recipients of allocation and a factor of production for the product itself. The $20 billion valuation assumes good national teams will show up. If the factor of production walks away, the valuation disappears.
In other words, member associations were not in a weaker position than outside shareholders — they held a kind of claim that outside shareholders don’t even have. That’s where I’d gotten it wrong.
And this isn’t the first time. In 2019, the European Club Association notified FIFA it would not take part in the new Club World Cup. The 2021 biennial World Cup proposal also died when European associations signaled they’d walk away. The same route has fired three times now. That’s not coincidence — it’s a mechanism.
Still, this mechanism’s limits are just as clear.
First, it’s costly. A boycott hurts the boycotters too. It needed agreement among 55 associations; it isn’t something usable day to day.
Second, it only works against a transaction. What fired this time was that the plan required member associations’ approval. The moment approval was sought, a window for refusal opened. An arrangement that requires no approval is outside this route’s reach.
Third, it doesn’t reach the seat itself. The plan disappeared, but the chairman remains in office. UEFA’s statement that “the current FIFA leadership has lost UEFA’s trust” also means there is no means of removing someone who has lost that trust.
In short, this isn’t a monitoring mechanism for the organization. It’s a veto over an individual transaction. The share, the monitoring gap, and the design of selection all remain exactly as they were.
The grounds for acquiring the asset and the method of disposing of it don’t match
I don’t think what was really at stake here was the compensation figure.
The World Cup as an asset was built up over a century on the promise that “FIFA is the trustee of a public good.” Broadcasters, sponsors, and national associations alike have all entrusted money and rights on the strength of that promise.
Lift that promise and cash out only the asset, and the grounds for acquisition and the method of disposal no longer match.
UEFA’s statement that “the soul and governance of football are not assets to be traded” lands on exactly that point, and I think it’s legally correct.
No sovereign state capable of stopping this appeared this time either. What stopped it were insiders who held the factor of production. There’s no guarantee that same hand can be played the same way next time.
—This has all been about one organization, FIFA. But this mechanism isn’t unique to sports bodies. Next time, I’ll look at the same device operating in an entirely different setting.
References
- Previous post, “How far does nature carry an extreme success?” — link
- Timeline up to the withdrawal (RTÉ / Press Association) — link
- Reporting on the withdrawal (CNN) — link
- UEFA’s statement of lost trust, observations on term limits and a “commissioner”-type position (CBS News) — link
- The £30.1 million offer and the September 19th deadline (Sky Sports) — link
- Advisor Cordeiro’s resignation and the AFC’s opposition (NBC News) — link
- The European Club Association’s 2019 notice of non-participation in the Club World Cup — link
- Projected revenue for the 2026 tournament, among other figures (Forbes JAPAN) — link
- Hansmann (1980) “The Role of Nonprofit Enterprise,” Yale Law Journal 89 — link
- Pielke Jr. (2013) “How can FIFA be held accountable?,” Sport Management Review 16(3) — link
- Gibel, Überbacher & Scherer (2026) “Anti-corruption Reforms and Retrenchment in International Sport Federations: The Case of FIFA,” Business & Society — link
- Switzerland’s “Lex FIFA” (swissinfo) — link
- Glaeser & Shleifer (2001) “Not-for-profit entrepreneurs,” Journal of Public Economics 81(1) (bibliographic only)
- Bebchuk & Fried (2004) Pay Without Performance, Harvard University Press (same)
- Bueno de Mesquita, Smith, Siverson & Morrow (2003) The Logic of Political Survival, MIT Press (same)
- Geeraert (2018) “‘Bad barrels’: Corruption in international sport federations,” in Kihl ed., Corruption in Sport, Routledge (same)
- Hirschman (1970) Exit, Voice, and Loyalty, Harvard University Press (same)
This piece was conceived and directed by Yuichiro Kuzuryu, and written by AI.
Originally published in Japanese at https://clazytech.com/2026/08/1736/. Translated with LLM assistance and reviewed before publication.