Traits don't decide success, but they raise the stakes
Founding myths follow a fixed template
Startup founding stories mostly follow the same template.
A shy, awkward young man who just loves technology. He builds a service on a whim, it grows at a terrifying speed, and before anyone notices, it has swallowed the world. That’s the template.
This template has one convenient property. Whatever the outcome, nobody questions the founder’s own character. A good outcome becomes a story about talent. A bad outcome gets waved away as “it just happened that way” or “someone who came later did it.”
Let me pose a naive question. Extraordinary scale, extraordinary influence: how much do those extreme outcomes actually relate to traits the person had from the start? Or is it just chance?
This time I want to set aside judgments of good and evil and look at the structure instead.
Let me state the conclusion up front. Traits do have an effect. Just not the effect people naively assume.
That intuition already has a name
First, let’s line up the theories on the side that says traits matter.
One is “imprinting theory” from management studies. The values a founder imprints during the founding period, the choice of domain, the character of the early members: these stay with the organization for a long time (Marquis & Tilcsik, 2013). This directly rebuts the “someone who came later did it” explanation.
Another is research on “CEO narcissism” (Chatterjee & Hambrick, 2007). It measured 111 CEOs in the computer/software industry using non-contact indicators: the size of their own photo in the annual report, press exposure, frequency of first-person singular pronouns in interviews, and the compensation gap with the No. 2 executive. CEOs with higher narcissism scores pursued flashier strategies, made more acquisitions, and produced more extreme swings in performance.
There’s a caveat, though. Narcissism only produces big wins or big losses; averaged out, it looks no different from anyone else. This point matters later.
Then there’s research on the “Dark Triad” (narcissism, Machiavellianism, psychopathy). A growing body of evidence shows these traits strongly predict emergence as a leader, whether someone rises to the position, more than leadership effectiveness, whether they perform well once there. And the higher up the hierarchy, the more concentrated these traits become.
In other words, such traits don’t determine whether the outcome is good or bad. They just carry a person closer to the seat at that scale.
Placing a single proper name as an example
Let me put down one concrete example. Facebook’s founder, as a data point. He’s often cited as the archetype of that template: a shy tech lover who built something that grew explosively.
Let’s just confirm the facts. The ideal he publicly names isn’t Caesar but Augustus, Rome’s first emperor. In a 2018 New Yorker piece, he referenced Augustus as someone who established 200 years of peace through brutal methods, and expressed interest in that trade-off. His honeymoon was in Rome. His second daughter is named August.
This isn’t material for condemnation. It’s merely an observation of consistency: a person with a strong interest in the design of dominance made designing dominance his life’s work. The same consistency turns up abundantly in the biographies of widely admired giants. So the proper name isn’t the protagonist here. It’s just one data point for checking the structure.
It doesn’t hold as a sufficient condition
Now let’s surface the limits of the trait-based argument.
There are two readings of the claim. “People who reach that scale usually had that trait from the start.” That’s the necessary-condition claim. The other: “If you have that trait, you reach that scale.” That’s the sufficient-condition claim.
The theories below all show, together, that the latter doesn’t hold. They don’t deny the former. In fact, the effect is that only the former survives.
Social psychology’s “Romance of Leadership” (Meindl, Ehrlich & Dukerich, 1985) holds that humans over-attribute organizational outcomes to the individual leader. This intensifies especially for extreme outcomes, great success or great failure. Reasoning that reads causes into character after the fact makes “outcome → trait” look like proof of “trait → outcome.” It’s a device that makes a necessary condition look like a sufficient one.
Denrell & Liu (2012, PNAS) show that the more extreme the performance, the larger luck’s contribution. Their model shows that when evaluating outliers, we should pull the estimate further back toward the average. Under intense competition, people with lower expected ability take on excessive risk aiming for first place. In other words, within the group that satisfies the trait, who actually ends up on top is decided by luck. This is the stage where luck fills the gap left by the missing sufficient condition.
Philosophy’s “moral luck” (Williams and Nagel) points out that reading character backward from outcomes after the fact is itself a suspect move. Someone with the same trait who never produced the result never gets their character questioned. In the language of ethics: traits are not a sufficient condition.
What we don’t see are the ones who never made it through
Let me also lay out the weakness of this argument. It has low falsifiability.
The same fragments of trait should turn up in equal measure among the countless people who never became anyone at all. But the observer sees the extreme outcome first, then goes looking for the traits afterward. So “the overwhelming majority who had the same traits but never reached that scale” is structurally invisible.
This invisible mass is precisely the survivorship-bias evidence that traits are a necessary condition but not a sufficient one.
The same pattern shows up in sports. Meta-analyses find that deliberate practice explains about 18% of the variance in skill. Narrow it down to top athletes only, and it’s just 1% (Macnamara et al., 2016). Discipline from childhood is a necessary condition for entering the pool that produces the national team. But within that pool, who actually makes the national team is barely explained by it at all.
Separating necessary from sufficient
Here’s where the check lands.
There is a causal relationship between trait and outcome. But it’s causal only as a necessary condition. Who gets close to the seat at that scale: traits matter here. An orientation toward control, an obsession beyond the ordinary, a high tolerance for risk. The population is strongly skewed toward these qualities. This part is fairly deterministic.
Beyond that, who actually wins within the group: luck and excessive risk-taking matter here. This part is thoroughly probabilistic.
And once in office, power reproduces and amplifies the original disposition. The imprint burns itself into the organization.
Here’s the crucial point. This structure operates equally on the good and the bad. What the necessary-condition stage selects for is who can become enormous, not whether that enormity is good or bad for the world. Traits explain only up to the entrance of the outcome. The content of the outcome, whether it protects dignity or damages it, lies outside this stage.
So the trait-based argument can be used as a tool for conviction, but the exact same logic can be used just as well for acquittal. A necessary condition doesn’t choose the defendant.
The cleanest way to put it is this: traits are a necessary condition, not a sufficient one.
And the necessary condition is equally indifferent to the person who made it through and to the countless who didn’t. It’s always the person looking back from behind who adds the story.
References
- Marquis & Tilcsik (2013) “Imprinting: Toward a Multilevel Theory”, Academy of Management Annals — link
- Chatterjee & Hambrick (2007) “It’s All about Me”, Administrative Science Quarterly — link
- Review on the Dark Triad and leadership emergence — link
- New Yorker profile’s remarks on Augustus (summarized by CNBC) — link
- Meindl, Ehrlich & Dukerich (1985) “The Romance of Leadership” — link
- Denrell & Liu (2012) PNAS, and other papers (author’s full list) — link
- Macnamara, Moreau & Hambrick (2016) Perspectives on Psychological Science — link
- “Moral Luck”, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy — link
This piece was drafted and directed by Kuzuryu, with the writing done by AI.
Originally published in Japanese at https://clazytech.com/2026/07/1724/. Translated with LLM assistance and reviewed before publication.