Extreme Success Only Partly Comes Down to Character
Founding myths follow a fixed template
Startup founding stories mostly follow a fixed template.
A shy, inarticulate young person who just loved technology. The service he happened to build grew at a terrifying pace, and before anyone noticed it had swallowed the world — that’s the template.
This template has one convenient property. Whatever way the results turn out, the founder’s own character never has to be questioned. A good result becomes a story about talent; a bad one gets filed under “that’s just how it happened” or “someone who came later did it.”
Let me pose a naive question here. Extraordinary scale, extraordinary influence — how much does that outcome actually relate to traits the person had from the start? Or is it just chance?
This time I want to check the arithmetic on that, setting aside judgments of good and bad, as a matter of structure.
I’ll state the conclusion up front. Traits do work. But they work differently from how one naively imagines.
That intuition already has a name
First, let’s line up the theories on the side that says traits work.
One is “imprinting theory” in management studies. The values a founder stamps into a company at founding, the choice of domain, the character of the early members — these stay with the organization for a long time (Marquis & Tilcsik, 2013). This directly rebuts the “someone who came later did it” explanation.
Another is research on “CEO narcissism” (Chatterjee & Hambrick, 2007). It measured 111 CEOs in the computer/software industry using non-contact indicators: the size of their own photo in annual reports, press exposure, frequency of first-person-singular pronouns in interviews, and the pay gap with the No. 2 executive. CEOs higher in narcissism pursue flashier strategy, make more acquisitions, and produce more extreme swings in performance.
There is a caveat, though. It only produces big wins or big losses — averaged out, it’s no different from anyone else. That matters later.
And then there’s research on the “Dark Triad” (narcissism, Machiavellianism, psychopathy). A growing body of evidence shows these traits strongly predict rising to leadership — reaching the position — more than leadership effectiveness — doing well once there. The higher up the hierarchy, the more concentrated these traits become.
In other words, these traits don’t determine whether the outcome is good or bad. They simply carry a person closer to that scale of seat.
As an example, place a single proper name
Let me put one concrete example here: the Facebook founder, as a data point. He’s often cited as the archetype of that template — a shy tech-lover who started something and watched it grow ferociously.
Consider the facts. The ideal he publicly states isn’t Caesar, but Augustus, Rome’s first emperor. In a 2018 New Yorker piece, he describes Augustus as someone who established 200 years of peace through harsh methods, and says he finds that tradeoff interesting. He spent his honeymoon in Rome. His second daughter is named August.
This isn’t material for condemnation. It’s simply an observation of consistency: a person with a strong interest in the design of domination made the design of domination his work. The same kind of consistency turns up, just as easily, in the biographies of widely admired giants. So the proper name here isn’t the protagonist. It’s a single data point for checking the structure.
It doesn’t hold as a sufficient condition
Now let’s lay out the limits of arguments that invoke traits.
What’s being claimed has two readings. “People who reach that scale usually already had that trait from the start” — that’s a necessary-condition claim. “If you have that trait, you’ll reach that scale” — that’s a sufficient-condition claim.
The theories below all show, together, that the latter doesn’t hold. They don’t deny the former. In fact, they work in a way that leaves only the former standing.
Social psychology’s “Romance of Leadership” (Meindl, Ehrlich & Dukerich, 1985) holds that people over-attribute organizational outcomes to the individual leader. This intensifies especially for extreme outcomes — great success or great failure. Reasoning that reads character into causes after the results are in makes “outcome → trait” look like proof of “trait → outcome.” It’s a device that makes a necessary condition look like a sufficient one.
Denrell & Liu (2012, PNAS) find that the more extreme the performance, the larger luck’s contribution. Their model shows that when evaluating outliers, we should pull our estimates further back toward the mean. Under intense competition, those with lower expected ability take on excessive risk in pursuit of first place. In other words, among the group that satisfies the trait, who actually ends up at the top is decided by luck. This is the stage where luck fills the gap left by the absence of a sufficient condition.
Philosophy’s “moral luck” (Williams and Nagel) questions the very act of reading character back into a person after the fact, based on outcomes. Someone with the same traits who never produced the result escapes having their character questioned at all. In the language of ethics: traits are not a sufficient condition.
What stays invisible are the people who didn’t make it through
Let me also lay out the weakness of this argument. Its falsifiability is low.
The same fragments of trait should turn up just as often among the countless people who never became anything. But the observer sees the extreme outcome first, then goes looking for the trait afterward. So “the overwhelming majority who had the same traits but never reached that scale” is structurally invisible.
This invisible mass is exactly the evidence — in the form of survivorship bias — that traits are a necessary but not sufficient condition.
The same number shows up in sports. In a meta-analysis, deliberate practice explains about 18% of the variance in skill. Narrow it to elite athletes only, and that drops to just 1% (Macnamara et al., 2016). Discipline from early childhood is a necessary condition for entering the pool that is the national team. But within that pool, it explains almost nothing about who actually makes the team.
Separating the necessary from the sufficient
Here’s where the arithmetic lands.
There is causation between trait and outcome. But it’s causation as a necessary condition. Who can get close to that scale of seat — here, traits matter. An orientation toward control, an obsession bordering on the abnormal, a high appetite for risk: the population is strongly skewed toward these qualities. This part is fairly deterministic.
Beyond that, who actually wins within the group — here, luck and excess risk matter. This part is thoroughly probabilistic.
And once someone takes the position, power reproduces and amplifies the original disposition. The imprint burns itself into the organization.
Here’s the crucial point. This structure works just the same for the virtuous and the villainous. What the necessary-condition stage selects for is “who can become enormous,” not “whether that enormity is good or bad for the world.” Traits can only explain as far as the entrance to the outcome. The content of the outcome — whether it protects dignity or destroys it — lies outside this stage.
So an argument that invokes traits can be used as a tool for conviction, but the exact same logic can be used just as well for acquittal. A necessary condition doesn’t pick a side.
I think the cleanest way to put it is this: traits are a necessary condition, not a sufficient one.
And a necessary condition is equally indifferent to the person who made it through and to the countless who didn’t. It’s always the person looking back from afterward who adds the story.
References
- Marquis & Tilcsik (2013) “Imprinting: Toward a Multilevel Theory”, Academy of Management Annals — Link
- Chatterjee & Hambrick (2007) “It’s All about Me”, Administrative Science Quarterly — Link
- Review on the Dark Triad and leader emergence — Link
- The Augustus remarks from the New Yorker profile (summarized by CNBC) — Link
- Meindl, Ehrlich & Dukerich (1985) “The Romance of Leadership” — Link
- Denrell & Liu (2012) PNAS and related work (author’s publication list) — Link
- Macnamara, Moreau & Hambrick (2016) Perspectives on Psychological Science — Link
- “Moral Luck”, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy — Link
This piece was conceived and directed by Yuichiro Kuzuryu, written by AI.
Originally published in Japanese at https://clazytech.com/2026/07/1724/. Translated with LLM assistance and reviewed before publication.