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Multiplying EBITDA Gives You a Share Price, But Where Did That Multiple Come From

Pricing a company turns out to be a surprisingly satisfying exercise once you actually try it. After all, you get a share price from a single multiplication.

Take EBITDA, slap a round 10x on it. Subtract debt, divide by share count. There you go — price per share. With a calculator it’s done in three minutes. Clean and tidy.

But that three-minute satisfaction is exactly what’s always scared me.

EBITDA, as you know, is a kind of profit. It’s a number that strips out interest, taxes, and depreciation to isolate “the cash-generating power of the business itself.” If you run a hardware business where heavy equipment means depreciation chews up net income, it’s easy to see why EBITDA shows the real picture better than net income does.

Then you multiply this by a multiple to get the company’s price. What comes out is EV (Enterprise Value) — the price of the whole company, meaning the shareholders’ stake plus debt. Whether it’s M&A or fundraising, EV/EBITDA is usually the first thing that gets thrown around on the ground. I’ve been tinkering with investing as a hobby since my student days, and as someone leading a startup I’ve also sat on the side of being priced. That’s exactly why I’m saying this — this “multiple” is a slippery thing.

Many people think of the multiple as “a coefficient that projects future profit from current profit.” But what’s actually inside it is a bit different.

To be precise, the multiple is all the cash the business will generate going forward, discounted for risk and summed up, compressed into a single number. Theoretically, multiple ≈ 1 ÷ (required return − growth rate). When growth expectations are high the multiple swells; when risk is high it shrinks. In other words, both “the future” and “how precarious it is” are folded into this one number.

Written out like a textbook, that suddenly sounds hard, so let me break it down.

The multiple is, roughly, “how many years’ worth of current earnings you’re paying up front.” At 10x, it feels like you’re buying the company by paying 10 years’ worth of today’s annual profit.

But you don’t actually pay the full face value of those 10 years. There’s no guarantee that profit will still be there in 10 years. Tomorrow is iffy enough — nobody knows what happens in 10 years.

So “the further out the profit, the more heavily it gets discounted.” Next year’s profit counts almost at face value, year 10 counts for half, year 20 counts for next to nothing — it fades the further out you go. That’s what “discounting for risk” actually means.

And that’s where the company’s credibility comes in. For a company with a solid trajectory and strong growth, the discounting eases because “the future will probably deliver too,” so you’re willing to pay for more years — the multiple swells. For a shaky company, the future gets discounted hard, so you can only pay for 2–3 years — the multiple shrinks.

In short, a single multiple simultaneously packs in “how many years you’re paying for” and “how much you believe in that future.”

The multiplication method is, in a sense, a compressed version of DCF (Discounted Cash Flow). Up to here, it’s elegant.

The problem starts after this.

So in practice, how is that multiple actually decided? In most cases, it’s borrowed from comparable companies. “Similar companies trade at 8x, so we’re 8x too.”

Wait, hold on — doesn’t that feel off?

To begin with, a truly “identical business” barely exists in this world. The judgment shouldn’t be about whether the businesses look similar, but about whether their future growth rates and risks are similar. Even among SaaS companies, a company growing 20% a year and one that’s flat deserve wildly different multiples. Yet the moment you apply the same multiple because they’re “the same industry,” you’re guaranteed to be mispricing one of them.

And there’s something even trickier.

Even if you manage to find a perfect comparable, that company’s stock price already has the market’s assumptions baked into it. If the whole sector is in a bubble, the multiple you borrow stays bubbled too. Your valuation inherits the other company’s distortion wholesale.

The multiple method is, structurally, nothing more than relative valuation. All it’s really saying is “something similar is priced this way, so this should be roughly that too.” In principle, it can never answer the absolute question of “what is the right price.”

Charlie Munger’s famous jab at EBITDA as “bullshit earnings” is well known, but what I’m genuinely afraid of isn’t EBITDA itself — it’s the multiple sitting on top of it.

That’s why professionals always run DCF alongside it — the calculation method I just described as “what the multiple actually is,” discounting and summing future cash flows directly, without hiding it inside a multiple. With DCF, you have to spell out every assumption yourself: discount rate, growth rate, capital expenditure. That’s what makes it a yardstick of “absolute value” independent of market crowd psychology. Conversely, DCF can be made to say almost anything depending on your assumptions, so you pit it against the relative multiple, and when they diverge sharply, you go back and ask “which set of assumptions smells fishy.” It’s this triangulation that finally makes pricing work.

Writing this out, I realize the thing that looked most appetizing — “a share price from a single multiplication” — was actually hiding the most judgment calls.

The reason the multiple method is easy is that it stuffs everything DCF would otherwise force you to spell out one by one — growth rate, risk, choice of comparables — into a single number called “the multiple,” making it invisible.

The very reason it’s easy is also its weakness.

When we’re celebrating that “a share price came out of a single multiplication,” we may not be calculating anything at all — we might just be borrowing someone else’s assumptions.

By the way, a little while back I wrote a piece on SpaceX’s IPO called “245x — come on, that’s just insane”. Tracing that sense of unease back, I think it ultimately leads to this same question: where did the multiple come from in the first place?

This piece was drafted and directed by Yuichiro Kuzuryu, written by AI.


Originally published in Japanese at https://clazytech.com/2026/06/1661/. Translated with LLM assistance and reviewed before publication.