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245x Is Insane, and America Makes It Work Anyway

Starlink’s adjusted EBITDA runs around $7.2 billion a year. The IPO’s assumed valuation, meanwhile, is $1.77 trillion. Divide one by the other and you get roughly 245x.

For a normal telecom or infrastructure business, 20x to 30x would be reasonable. This one is being priced an order of magnitude above that, and it’s shaping up to be the largest IPO in history. Even Morningstar’s fair value calculation, a conservative estimate, puts it at $780 billion — less than half the IPO target.

But in America, this actually works.

What caught my attention was this: set the question “why does this pricing work in America” next to Japan and China, and you start to see a difference in the underlying design philosophy of what “going public” even means.

Investing has been a hobby of mine since my student days — I’m no expert — but I thought this was an interesting lens, so I’m writing it down.

Going public is “a device that converts expectation into cash, now”

Let me abstract this a bit.

An IPO is, in essence, a device that converts expectations about an unrealized future into cash in this present moment. In engineering terms, it’s a transducer that turns an input of expectation into an output of capital.

The problem is that the gain of this device — and who controls that gain — differs completely from country to country.

The same “expectation → cash” conversion device, and yet who reviews the story and who decides when cashing out is allowed are completely different. Let’s look at each in turn.

America: the market reviews the story (and often gets drunk on it)

The American device simply runs at high gain.

The market tolerates 245x because it’s buying “the story” rather than “the fundamentals.” In SpaceX’s case, merging with xAI in February 2026 created the ultimate story: space times AI. The price tag isn’t on Starlink’s current cash flow — it’s on the dream of AI and Mars beyond it.

What I felt firsthand running a company in the Bay Area was that over there, the story itself is the product being financed. In Japan, “so, how much profit are you making?” comes first. In America, “so, what future are you building?” comes first. The order is reversed.

There’s also something easy to overlook: the structure of founder control. Even after this IPO, Musk will keep holding over 82% of the voting rights. Through the dual-class share structure, he raises an enormous amount of money by selling stock, yet never gives up control.

In other words, the market “can buy the story, but can’t buy the company.” That’s the American way.

The timing of the cash-out was also entirely the founder’s choice. SpaceX stayed private for 24 years, then came out, fully prepared, as the largest IPO in history. A high-gain device, held in reserve until the moment it would have maximum effect.

A high-gain device will naturally overshoot. That’s a bubble. The fact that it keeps spinning anyway is both the extraordinary strength and the terrifying part of the American market.

Japan: the story to be reviewed is, to begin with, thin

Japan’s device runs at low gain.

So low that something strange happens: regulators’ energy isn’t directed at “cooling the dream down” but at “scolding companies for being too cheap.” This is the exact opposite of America, and I found it the most interesting part of all.

The symbol of this is the Tokyo Stock Exchange’s request for “management conscious of cost of capital and stock price” — the so-called below-1x PBR problem. It began in March 2023, and 2026 marks exactly three years since.

A PBR below 1x bluntly means the stock price is cheaper than the assets the company holds. It’s practically the market saying “you’d be better off dissolving.”

Lining up the numbers is brutal.

Three years after the request, the figure has dropped only 6 points from 50% in July 2022. The disclosure rate has climbed to 92%, but the substance of improvement is only halfway there. So heading into 2026, the Tokyo Stock Exchange has started publishing a side-by-side “cost of capital disclosure list” comparing each company’s efforts — pressure that amounts to calling companies out by name.

America worries “isn’t the dream priced too high.” Japan worries “why can’t we even get our own assets reflected in our stock price.” The direction of the problem is reversed from the start.

The philosophy of cash-out timing is equally contrasting. In Japan, the common pattern is listing small and early on the Growth Market, then stalling out. Rather than holding a high-gain device in reserve, companies run a low-gain device early, and the signal gets buried in noise.

China: the state screens the stories

In China’s device, the state holds the dial that controls gain.

The stage is the STAR Market (the Sci-Tech Innovation Board). Xi Jinping declared its establishment in 2018, and it began as a rare pilot of a registration-based system in China. Today 592 companies are listed, with “hard tech” at its core.

What matters here is that despite being called a “registration-based” system, whether a listing is approved comes down, in practice, to whether it aligns with state industrial strategy.

There’s a concrete example. Starting around late 2023, the CSRC (China Securities Regulatory Commission) effectively froze IPOs by loss-making companies (the “Fifth Listing Standard”). The stated reason was to protect market balance, and the tap was tightened. As a result, fundraising in 2024 plunged sharply from the year before.

Then in June 2025, at the Lujiazui Forum, CSRC chairman Wu Qing announced the reopening of the Fifth Standard for “quality” loss-making hard tech companies in fields like AI and robotics. IPOs in 2025 nearly doubled overnight, and GPU companies aiming to challenge Nvidia — Moore Threads and MetaX — listed one after another.

In other words, the state decides when cashing out is permitted, using a policy switch. A story that aligns with national goals like semiconductor self-sufficiency or “new quality productive forces” gets the tap opened. One that doesn’t gets it closed.

An even more blatant example is Ant Group’s $35 billion IPO in 2020, halted at the last minute. The state can kill a story overnight.

Not the market, not the founder — the state is the story’s reviewer. That’s the Chinese way.

Why does Japan turn conservative and America turn bullish — min versus argmax

So far this has been about who does the reviewing. I want to go one level deeper and lay out, as a structural matter, why Japanese pricing turns conservative and American pricing turns bullish.

Japanese pricing isn’t the “average” of what the parties involved hope for. In practice it’s a min operation.

A listing has a long line of stakeholders with something close to veto power: the lead underwriter, existing shareholders, business partners, the main bank, the auditing firm. The price converges to the minimum value that all of them can tolerate. The single most conservative link determines the value of the whole — the same way a signal passing through filters connected in series has its overall bandwidth set by the narrowest filter.

Brand, face, and external relationships all function, in effect, as constraints that raise each participant’s floor of tolerance. The more constraints get multiplied together, the further the solution gets pushed into a corner.

America is the opposite. The price isn’t decided by consensus across the whole market — it’s set by the “marginal optimist” who fills the order book during bookbuilding. There’s no need to convince everyone. As long as enough believers buy at the marginal price, that clears it.

So where Japan is a min (the most cautious party decides), America is closer to an argmax (the party who believes most strongly drives the price up). Both are “reviewing a story,” but one is a committee’s unanimous consent, and the other is an auction’s highest bid — completely different things.

The idea that it’s “a contest of who can make people believe the dream” is half right, but I’d correct the other half. I think it’s less a con and more a credit auction with ex-post settlement.

America’s approach is: get people to believe the dream and sell high first — if it’s wrong, lawsuits, short sellers, and the SEC come down on it afterward. The discipline sits after the fact. Japan is the opposite: every stakeholder finishes pricing it in beforehand, so all the conservatism is already baked in by the time the company lists. The discipline sits before the fact. You could also call it the difference between putting the control loop on the input side versus the output side.

There’s direct, head-on support for this view. There’s a long-standing criticism that Japanese IPOs are structurally underpriced — the offering price is too low and the opening price pops too much.

The lead underwriter’s real incentive isn’t “maximize the amount the issuer raises” — it’s “don’t let the listing fail, don’t damage the relationship with existing clients.” So they err on the safe side. Face and relationships quite literally push the price down. The Japan Securities Dealers Association’s 2022–23 review of the offering-price-setting process was exactly a response to this “excessively conservative” problem. The multiplicative structure was real enough to require institutional reform.

That said, let me set one counterargument alongside this. It’s a strong explanation from the supply (issuer) side, but there’s a hole on the demand side too.

Suppose you stripped away the stakeholders and let the issuer price boldly. Is there, in Japan to begin with, a thick enough pool of “marginal optimists” willing to pay up for that dream? Funds with a mandate to bet on growth, and individuals with the literacy to bet on dreams, aren’t as deep a pool as in America. In other words, Japan’s conservatism isn’t a one-sided problem — it’s driven from both sides: the seller’s min and the buyer’s thinness. Even if you peel away the stakeholders, if there’s no aggressive buyer on the other side, the contest never even begins.

To summarize, a market’s character can be cut along three axes.

Lined up along these three axes, China falls into a somewhat unusual quadrant: “argmax, pre-censored by the state.” Argmax is permitted only for stories that align with state strategy.

Which device do you want to live inside

Let me lay all of this out once more, plainly.

Here’s where you notice a paradox.

Even America, which looks the freest, has “the market can’t buy the company” baked in through founder control. Even China, which looks the least free, lets you cash out fastest, as long as you align with state intent.

Freedom and control aren’t as clean a pair of opposites as you’d think.

And Japan, perhaps, is neither free nor controlled — it’s simply bad at telling stories in the first place. The assets are there. The technology is there. And yet the gain of the device that converts them into expectation stays structurally low.

The unease I felt at SpaceX’s 245x probably wasn’t simply “that’s too high.” I think it was unease at the gap itself — at how differently the same device is designed, country by country.

For what it’s worth, I’m the suspicious type, so I’m not buying into the 245x dream. But if there were a stock that let you buy Starlink alone, I would buy it. Unfortunately, that device isn’t available anywhere in the world yet.

This piece was conceived and directed by Yuichiro Kuzuryu, with the writing done by AI.


Originally published in Japanese at https://clazytech.com/2026/06/1630/. Translated with LLM assistance and reviewed before publication.