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Startups Rig Payouts to Favor Equity Over Early Labor

There’s a story that recently gave me pause.

An acquaintance of mine was involved in a startup as an early member. He was a total novice, only about two years into his career, but he worked incredibly hard. In the early days, when the company had only a handful of people, he was one of the precious few who sacrificed sleep and meals to keep operations running. The company grew steadily and eventually went public.

Securities reports are public, so anyone can check them. The stock options he received amounted to a sum that was by no means small by ordinary employee standards. But compared to the returns the CEO-level people received, the gap was on the order of three zeros.

The CEO was talented, no question. My acquaintance himself respected the CEO sincerely. Many of the management decisions moved forward with the CEO’s approval or initiative. That much is true.

Still, I find myself thinking: what is this gap in amounts, exactly?

A four-layer structure

Let me try to untangle this sense of discomfort.

Surface layer: institutional rigidity. Caps on the stock option pool, pushback from existing shareholders, salary regulations at listed companies. These systems are rigid, as a matter of fact. But that rigidity isn’t an accident — it’s rigid precisely because it’s designed so that excess returns concentrate into equity positions. In other words, the large profits a company generates when it succeeds are structured to flow to whoever holds equity, and the various rules are built rigid so that this mechanism doesn’t break down.

Information asymmetry. At the time of joining, the company’s value is undetermined, and there’s no fair point of comparison. What percentage one’s own equity stake will ultimately amount to, how much other members have been granted, how the overall pool is designed — a new hire rarely has access to any of this. There is simply no material available for judging whether a given grant is fair.

A mismatch in risk type. The risk borne by an early member is a few years of career, health, opportunity cost. The risk borne by a founder is all of that plus personal guarantees, assets, reputation. The types of risk are indeed different. But the distribution of success follows an equity-based system rooted in capital invested. Labor’s contribution is designed out of the variables that determine return allocation.

Attribution to position, or attribution to contribution? The excess return at the time of listing belongs not to the contribution that moved the organization but to the position called equity. Distribution is determined not by talent or amount of contribution, but by who held the stock. This is the basic design of corporate law and securities markets itself.

Why it becomes a spiral

There’s a mechanism by which this structure reproduces itself.

A successful founder becomes a VC or an angel in the next cycle. He rationally reproduces, as-is, the very structure he himself experienced. Stock option pool ratios, valuation design, dilution design — every piece of industry common sense gets calibrated to tilt excess returns toward founders and investors, and becomes the norm for the next generation.

A structure, once established, reinforces itself recursively. That is the spiral.

Labor capital is not recognized as risk

Put simply, under the current institutional design, the investment of labor capital is not treated as taking on risk.

Monetary capital has an explicit invested amount, and its loss in case of failure is made visible. So it’s recognized as risk, and granted a claim on excess returns (equity).

Labor capital, on the other hand, has an invested amount that is invisible. The rebuttal “but you were getting paid, weren’t you?” is always available, and its loss in case of failure gets explained away with “you can just find another job.” So it isn’t recognized as risk, and no claim on excess returns is granted.

But in reality, the labor invested by early startup members carries the non-substitutability of time (a few years in your twenties never come back), an invisible loss of opportunity cost, and the risk of being branded “someone who was at a company that collapsed” if things fail. These are, economically, risks equivalent to the loss of monetary capital — but the structure of the institution is such that because they aren’t measured, they are treated as if they don’t exist.

Accounting treatment conceals the transfer

Digging one level deeper, this is a difference in accounting treatment that gets reflected directly in the capital structure.

Low salaries, unpaid overtime, no bonuses, working on holidays: these are processed on the P/L as cost reduction. No trace whatsoever remains on the balance sheet.

Monetary investment, convertible bonds, stock option grants, on the other hand, pass through the B/S and are converted into equity claims.

In other words, what is absorbed through the P/L leaves no trace in the capital structure; only what passes through the B/S remains.

Everything labor endured gets processed on the P/L side as cost reduction. And where does that reduction go? It’s booked as a rise in enterprise value, credited to shareholders’ equity. The portion of wages that workers forwent quietly transfers to shareholders’ equity. The transfer is happening, yet on the books it looks as though nothing happened.

It’s fair to call this exploitation. It differs a little from classical Marxist exploitation, the extraction of surplus value through wages. More precisely, it’s a design in which the right to receive the large profits of success gets distributed without regard to how much one contributed through labor. And in terms of sheer amount, this latter form is overwhelmingly larger.

How to keep one’s distance, as an individual

I have no power to change the prevailing tendencies of the world. I have no political power to change the institutions. So how, as an individual, can one keep distance from this spiral?

On the founder’s side, there’s the option of never selling and never going public. A business that can fund its growth through retained earnings and borrowing can do this. If a sale or an IPO is going to happen, one should properly design, in advance, how the excess return that shareholders receive will be distributed to employees. Going public or exiting via buyout without this design in place is, given that the structure is understood, willful exploitation — a failure to design distribution despite knowing better.

On the employee’s side, joining an already-listed company and simply drawing a normal salary is, if anything, the position furthest from the spiral. This is especially true at a company with a strong labor union that pushes for base pay raises rather than dividends. In a country with a European-style co-determination system, one can gain even more structural distance.

For those who are freelance or working on contract, refusing to compromise on price is the greatest defense. “In exchange, you’ll get such-and-such in the future” is an invitation into a claim on excess returns, and in practice produces the same structure as labor invested without ever receiving stock options. Taking everything as a lump-sum cash payment maximizes one’s distance from the spiral.

The “difficult person” problem

There is, however, an unwritten rule here. A person who won’t compromise on price risks being labeled difficult and finding the work dries up.

I think this is a self-defense mechanism of the exploitative structure. The structure reproduces itself by favoring those who accept exploitation and excluding those who refuse it. The label “difficult person” is a marker the structure issues to protect itself.

The countermeasures: lower your own replaceability, diversify your client portfolio, build grounds on which you can say “I’m not being greedy, this is simply the market rate” (using externally referenceable benchmarks like overseas rates, published consulting fees, the going rate among peers), and filter out clients who find you difficult. The clients who remain are the ones who can accept those terms — in other words, the ones with whom an equal transaction is possible.

The good that is within reach

As I’ve written here, I have neither the power to shift the world’s prevailing tendencies nor the political power to redesign the institutions. This structure is tied to the human desire for monopoly to begin with, so it can’t fundamentally be changed. I once watched, from the sidelines, a buyout from existing shareholders at a company I was deeply involved with. The president’s exhaustion was severe, and he lost a great deal financially too. Each side came to dislike the other, and no good resolution was found.

The scale of the money gets decided in the hands of a few people. Outside of that, respect, effort, even gratitude have no power to move the numbers. A relationship that began in good faith turns, before you notice, into something murky and estranged. If one can avoid ever holding such a thing in the first place, nothing is better than that.

What I myself can do is only to make the handful of companies I’m involved with a little better. If ten founders of the next generation build their companies with distribution design for employees built in from the start, the lives of the 100 or 1,000 employees who follow will be changed. Even without changing the institutions themselves, one can change how those institutions are operated. All that’s left is to concentrate one’s resources on the good that is within reach.

This piece was conceived and directed by Yuichiro Kuzuryu, written by AI.


Originally published in Japanese at https://clazytech.com/2026/04/1588/. Translated with LLM assistance and reviewed before publication.