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Japan Beats Spain 2-1 and Reaches the Knockout Stage Again

In the final group stage match of the Qatar World Cup, Japan pulled off a 2-1 come-from-behind win over Spain.

Excitement, surprise, relief — a tangle of emotions, but first I simply want to celebrate reaching the knockout stage. And I want to take a moment, at least in my head for now, to imagine how this World Cup will be remembered in the future history of Japanese football.

<A match where it’s hard to name a single key man>

My honest first thought when the match ended was that this was a match where it was really hard to say “well, today’s key man was so-and-so.”

If I had to name one, I’d say manager Hajime Moriyasu. (Then again, the manager is inevitably the key man in every match anyway.)

Simply put, there were a lot of key men. Really, everyone was.

We as viewers probably need to learn a new way of watching by now: Moriyasu doesn’t come into a match with a 90-minute plan, he builds it as two 45-minute matches. That was true against Germany, and it was true against Costa Rica too.

The 45-minute split happens to align with halftime, but either way, he isn’t thinking in terms of “dominate the opponent for 90 minutes” or “defend well for 90 minutes.” He seems to design it as: this kind of match for the first 45, and this kind of match for the second 45.

Seen that way, Yuto Nagatomo — who spent the first half purely marking Nico Williams, unable to keep possession at all, and came away looking a bit flat — had in a sense faithfully carried out his mission. The team had probably given up on attacking down the left in the first half.

Takefusa Kubo, too, looked considerably less stiff than against Germany and showed good play, but wasn’t involved in any clear chances. Understood as part of the game plan, though, he too faithfully carried out his role.

Right from the start, the back three Japan opened with was a formation built with Spain’s wide players’ height in mind, but the defense-to-attack concept stayed consistent throughout.

Still, the low starting position of the press was a concern.

Daizen Maeda up front pressed Busquets in an oddly fixated way, which failed to sufficiently cut off passing lanes — Spain’s back line must have found that quite comfortable. It might have been worth trying the opposite, deliberately leaving the lane to Busquets open and targeting him there, but presumably the judgment was “there’s no need to even try it, it would surely get punished.”

Either way, once it became clear the ball couldn’t be fed to Busquets from the back line, what did Spain do? Pedri dropped deep. By taking up that deeper position, he completely neutralized Japan’s press.

This was probably an individual, in-the-moment judgment on his part, but it was an extremely precise piece of positioning, the kind you only come to appreciate watching from outside, on TV.

When Pedri drops to Busquets’s side, or even close to the back line, it opens up a vacant zone behind him. In principle, the player who should fill that zone for Japan is one of the two defensive midfielders, Ao Tanaka or Wataru Endo, but in the first half there was major confusion over this.

The reason was the back three.

Japan played a back three against Spain’s front three, but Williams and Olmo are both good at drifting wide. That pulls Japan’s wing-backs, Nagatomo and Ito, into an effectively back-five shape marking those two, which leaves two of the three center-backs without a direct marker. One of them then picks up Gavi, and the other is left free. That part is straightforward, and in theory it should free up one of the defensive midfielders to push forward.

Easy to say in words, but this coordination was extremely difficult in practice. Morata isn’t the type to drift wide, so he’s easy to track, but Gavi moves everywhere. Williams tends to stay wide, while Olmo comes inside into something like a second-striker position. The handoffs between markers didn’t go smoothly, and a large gap opened up in front of the defensive midfielders as a result, which Spain exploited well.

Also, unless the defensive midfielders step up and create a point to win the ball, a counterattack after regaining possession loses much of its effect. Not enough numbers, no space, and a deep starting position.

So Japan would generally get surrounded and dispossessed almost immediately. It had that kind of feel, plainly.

By around the 30th minute of the first half, Japan had finally begun to fix this issue, but conceding a goal amid that confusion was very costly.

Still, at 0-1, the flow wasn’t especially bad, though honestly there was no sense at all that Spain was in danger of being beaten. That was roughly the atmosphere heading into the second half.

In the end, that turned out to work in Japan’s favor.

At the start of the second half, Spain carried over the first half’s relaxed tempo, but Japan pressed as if they were a different team.

From a press deep in Spain’s territory, Junya Ito contested a trapping mistake by the opponent, the ball spilled loose, and Ritsu Doan struck a left-footed shot from the middle distance. It was his favorite kind of angle, the kind he’s scored from repeatedly in the Bundesliga, and naturally it worked against Unai Simón too. A brilliant goal to equalize.

Spain were clearly lacking concentration. Maybe news of the Germany-Costa Rica match had reached them at halftime; maybe, seeing Japan’s lack of attacking threat, they let their guard down thinking “today should finish easily.”

Either way, Tanaka, shrewdly targeting that looseness, pushed considerably further forward. Tanaka played it right, Doan put in a cross, Mitoma cut it back, and Tanaka was there — for a defensive midfielder to arrive in that position in front of goal, in a match where Japan had been pinned back so heavily in the first half, takes real conviction.

There was probably a clear instruction behind it.

The match then saw Japan withstand Spain’s ensuing onslaught and hold on for the win.

Let’s go through a few key points below.

Partway through the second half, I noticed a clear sense that something was off in the overall balance. Pedri’s positioning had become more advanced. This continued until around the 20th minute of the second half, for a while even after Japan had taken the lead.

As a result, the vacant zone that had tormented Japan in the first half instead turned into hunting ground for Japan’s press. All of Japan’s goals were triggered by the front line’s pressing, and Pedri’s positioning actually had a large influence on this.

I’ve rarely seen Pedri’s positioning be wrong, so I suspect it was an instruction from the manager. Spain’s front line is thin, effectively just Morata, so I can understand wanting to add more thickness there. But that doesn’t seem like a strategy Spain, who were in the lead and would have been fine with a draw, should have taken.

Luis Enrique’s misjudgment was a major opportunity for Japan.

<The assumption that Busquets wouldn’t shoot from distance>

Late in the second half, Japan set up a solid block in front of their own goal. The reason they could commit to this fully was Busquets.

In fact, Japan barely pressed Busquets at all. Their positioning seemed to say, “go ahead and shoot from distance if you want.” Instead, they focused their preparation on pressing whoever received the ball after Busquets. The thing you least want when holding a solid block is a shot from distance: if it’s on target, there’s always a decent chance of a goal via a deflection or a goalkeeper error. So normally you’d have to defend it actively, thinking “what if he shoots.”

But Japan, whether as a result of scouting or some other deliberate decision, applied no pressure on Busquets at all.

Given how much they’d positioned Maeda in the first half specifically to deny the ball to Busquets, this looks odd, but it could be read either as “they fixed the first-half problem,” or as a deliberate plan: tighten the central block, win it back out wide, and just let Busquets have the ball.

Takehiro Tomiyasu’s introduction in the 69th minute was obviously a message to the team: “we’re going to defend this out.” At the same moment, Spain brought on Ansu Fati for Gavi, Barça’s phenomenally strong attacker. The substitution that effectively pitted Tomiyasu directly against Fati was spot on.

Had Moriyasu read it? Or was it coincidence?

Tomiyasu neutralized Fati — it’s fair to say he let him do nothing at all. It was so good there are no words for it. As he’s already shown repeatedly this season at Arsenal, there’s almost no attacker who can get past Tomiyasu in a one-on-one, confined wide battle, even at the very highest level of the world game. Mikel Arteta always deploys Tomiyasu against the opposing wide attacker he wants to erase from the match, and the effect is genuinely huge. Arteta invented that trick, but Moriyasu clearly took a page from it too.

<Spain’s back line in the closing stages>

Deep into the closing stages of the match, a certain judgment was clearly at work on the Spanish bench. Even if they hadn’t been feeding in updates on the Germany-Costa Rica match throughout, by this point they surely had informed the players.

Marco Asensio up front was shouting with a touch of visible frustration, but Spain’s back line never pushed up at all until the very end. They were never a team built around power play to begin with, but even so, the full-backs could have taken much higher positions. In particular, Dani Carvajal, brought on partway through, probably never once overlapped past midfield. That’s hard to reconcile with how a full-back on a losing team would normally play.

In other words, the judgment “this is fine as it is” looks to have been at work to some degree.

Of course there’s pride at stake too, as a World Cup-winning nation — it’s hard to believe the public would approve of a team that doesn’t attack. But I think the judgment leaned soft nonetheless.

Various media outlets had “predicted” this, but personally, I had taken the view that it was possible depending on how the closing stages played out, not something they’d deliberately aim for.

So above all, what’s remarkable is that it was Japan who created that situation in the first place.

There must have been tremendous pressure.

The defense was, without question, where the greatest sense of inadequacy came from in the Costa Rica match.

“Holding firm against a deep-lying opponent and settling for a scoreless draw” — that kind of match happens plenty in the world. The World Cup is no exception.

So the one thing you absolutely must not do is this:

“Conceding one goal to a deep-lying opponent through a careless mistake, and losing.”

That’s the kind of thing that happens maybe once in several dozen matches, and yet it happened, exactly like that.

“Why didn’t we do this,” “if only we’d done that there” — thoughts like that must have run through their heads over and over. But simply resetting with “there’s still the next match, we can win that one” and standing back up again takes tremendous mental strength.

With the victory, that tension broke, and the tears came. What a wonderful thing it is to cry from winning.

There’s no need to cry again even if Japan beats Croatia in the next match.

People call a miracle that happens twice inevitable.

There’s no more surprise left.

There’s only joy there now.


Originally published in Japanese at https://clazytech.com/2022/12/1536/. Translated with LLM assistance and reviewed before publication.