Investors Fund Companies That Look Like Obvious Disasters
I’ve mostly just been writing about things I happened to be thinking about, so for a change I’ll write about something someone actually asked me.
Why do investors who are supposed to be extremely, extremely smart pour huge sums of money into companies that any amateur can tell at a glance are “100% a disaster waiting to happen”?
News stories about investors and VCs (venture capital firms) putting hundreds of millions of dollars into companies that make no sense are common.
The other day, a friend whose career path — big company to startup — has a fair amount in common with mine asked me the question in the title, and I gave him my own take. He didn’t bring it up himself, but the Adam Neumann case is probably the leading recent example.
Adam Neumann
“What exactly is ‘Flow,’ WeWork founder Adam Neumann’s controversial new company?” https://www.esquire.com/jp/news/a40928695/what-is-flow-wework-ceo-adam-neumanns-new-company/
“Clouded in uncertainty… a16z puts $380 million (¥50 billion) into former WeWork CEO’s new ‘rental housing community’ venture. The explanation doesn’t add up” https://www.businessinsider.jp/post-257929
He’s the founder of WeWork, famous for a series of scandals that came to light before the IPO and blew the whole thing up. It also emerged that he sold a personally owned domain to the company at an inflated price (he later refunded it), so this looks fairly clearly like a person with a serious shortage of ethics (I don’t know him either directly or indirectly, for what it’s worth).
For a person who flamed out like that — and it wasn’t simply a case of the business failing to work out — a hugely famous Silicon Valley VC backed a second attempt with a massive investment. A lot of people probably feel that, Silicon Valley’s culture of embracing failure notwithstanding, this is really a bit much.
Honestly, I’m one of them.
It’s not just Adam Neumann, and it’s not just Silicon Valley
For example, GrooveX, the company developing LOVOT, is also
a company whose growth prospects are unclear but which has somehow received a massive amount of funding.
The product is genuinely well made, and meticulously crafted down to the smallest detail. I imagine the designers must have had a great time working on it. But on the “obvious” question of whether the investment will pay off, a lot of people must be wondering whether conventional sales plus a subscription model can really produce a growth curve that justifies the investment. In fact, most people probably thought that from the moment the company launched. And yet a lot of money went in.
SEVEN DREAMERS can fairly be called one of Japan’s representative flame-outs (the verdict is already in). It raised roughly $55 million, built a fully automatic laundry-folding machine, and sold essentially none of them — a wonderfully clean failure.
As I wrote in another post (Q. Is it true that most jobs will be replaced by AI?), it’s a fairly common story for a project to be “technically interesting” but, once you step back and think calmly for a moment, you immediately realize “wait, who’s actually going to buy this?” — in other words, a project with no visible PMF (Product Market Fit) at all. Coming up with a sharp idea is, once you get used to it, easier than people think. But whether it will actually sell is an entirely different matter.
And yet huge amounts of cash get raised to build things like that anyway.
That this happens at a frequency that’s hard to overlook is simply the nature of the startup investing world.
Before answering the “why?” in the title, let me first lay out the textbook explanation.
Investing — not just at VCs — is always done with a portfolio in mind. Betting everything on a single company isn’t investing. It’s gambling as a hobby. (Even serious gamblers diversify.)
There are various ways to construct a portfolio, but a common pattern is “the budget is fixed by category.” Naturally a budget doesn’t have to be fully spent just because it exists, but as a “salaried capitalist,” it would be strange if that budget didn’t shape your thinking most of the time.
In other words, once a huge investment budget has been allocated to a category, finding places to put it is hard work. Rather than painstakingly hunting down startups that are certain to succeed and doling out a few million dollars here, a few million dollars there, it’s only natural psychologically to want to hand a large lump sum to an entrepreneur you trust to push things forward aggressively, at least up to a point.
Outsiders can observe many individual investment decisions, but they can’t see the full shape of a portfolio — and that’s one trigger for ordinary people to react with “why did this company get this amount of money?”
<Hitting 1 in 20 is doing well>
It’s often said that the five-year survival rate for startups is around 0.5%. Well, that figure includes companies students launched on a whim, so the real number probably varies somewhat. On the other hand, among companies that have reached the level where a VC will invest, the probability of actually reaching some kind of exit is said to be excellent if it’s 5%. That’s 1 in 20.
Of course this depends on the investment amount and the structure for recovering it, so in reality all kinds of factors are tangled together, but roughly speaking, this kind of rough number explains it.
It’s fine if 19 out of 20 companies fail.
In fact, if you haven’t tried 20 companies, that’s arguably more of a problem.
Failure matters.
For example, the contrast between Showroom and Pococha gets brought up a lot these days, and some people are probably struck by the fact that what could be called rival services emerged from the same group.
But this kind of thing is completely normal in the world of launching new businesses, not just startups — you try something, it fails, and you use that failure to build something better. It’s very simple.
So while Showroom, launched earlier, might look like it was cut loose and abandoned, that’s entirely normal — it failed to make the most of the chance it was given. At least it didn’t die unnoticed; it left behind enough of a trace to serve as a reference for what came after, which is arguably a considerably better outcome.
The more failures there are, the better the future gets. And for that, 19 companies have to miss.
The equity funding scheme was an invention that made that possible.
<Some things can be due-diligenced, and some can’t>
Warren Buffett, the so-called god of investing, is said to hold to the principle of “don’t invest in a business you don’t understand,” and true to that principle, he reportedly now regrets not investing in early Amazon.
But my own personal sense is that investing in a company you can’t due-diligence is simply insane. (Buffett’s got it right.)
That said, most capitalists are finance people — only a small minority come from engineering or research backgrounds. At best, most of the rest come from consulting. In other words, the chances of being able to do proper due diligence, especially in technical domains, are extremely low. (Top VCs in the US and Europe are quite different in this regard, but for now I’m talking about the general case.)
When a startup runs an investment round, the terms “lead” and “follower” get used. The lead is the person who runs the round, and the followers are the people who invest alongside the lead’s terms.
Usually the lead is decided first, and the followers, true to the name, come along afterward. In other words, there are followers who come along by trusting entirely in the lead’s due diligence results. No — there are plenty of them. No — that’s mostly how it works.
Most VC people would probably object, “we’re not that sloppy about it,” and a small number of serious, capable people would genuinely say, “you’re right, I’m sorry” — but countless tragedies and comedies have proven that the world isn’t always that proper.
The Theranos case is a famous example. (Theranos had all the classic startup clichés packed into it)
But if a VC refuses to invest in companies it can’t due-diligence on its own, the categories and stages it can handle become quite limited, and it loses a lot of room to grow. In most cases a VC also has to listen to some extent to its LPs (the people providing the money), and has to keep up with the trends and currents of the times.
Since personnel costs are essentially the entirety of a VC’s expenses, firms often run with a surprisingly small headcount (that’s how they turn a profit). There’s a limit to how diverse a team you can assemble, and being too fussy about it just eats into profits. Given that, following a capable lead’s judgment and putting in two or three investments isn’t an unreasonable thing to do.
Up to this point I’ve laid out three commonly cited factors.
Stepping back, you can see some degree of rationality behind the behavior. (Whether that’s the best approach is of course a different question, and there’s plenty of room for debate.)
Cases of “huh? why this company, this much money?” are, I think, never going to run out. Human psychology plays a large part in it. Some economists apparently argue that “it’s healthy for an economy to have bubbles form and burst at some reasonable frequency,” and historically there does seem to be some truth to that.
There will always be people willing to take on the kind of life risk that John Law took — being hailed as the darling of the age only to end up a hunted man — and the era will keep turning as the leading roles keep changing hands.
(Reference: Running away isn’t even shameful — it’s the smart move: toward a life that doesn’t depend on madness)
Investors, the “supporting characters of the age,” are always waiting for someone willing to dance on the stage they’ve set up.
Originally published in Japanese at https://clazytech.com/2022/10/1494/. Translated with LLM assistance and reviewed before publication.