Theranos Was Every Startup Cliché Compressed Into One Company
I read Bad Blood.
Bad Blood: Secrets and Lies in a Silicon Valley Startup
It’s a book by the Wall Street Journal reporter who exposed the fact that Theranos, once one of the largest unicorn companies in the world, was in reality a company steeped in lies and fabrication. Looking back at the timeline, the exposé and the company’s collapse happened right around when I had just moved from the US to Japan and was working on launching a business at a startup, so honestly I only caught a glimpse of Theranos in some online article and thought “you’re kidding me” at the time. But I had watched closely how Elizabeth Holmes was being lionized in Silicon Valley, so the shock hit me that much harder. (Though I was busy with my own stuff at the time, so I’d completely forgotten about it, lol.)
The book records in vivid detail the confessions of former employees and other people involved, and the author’s struggle to get the story published after obtaining them. Extremely shocking episodes line up one after another, but if you stop and think calmly about it, you realize: “Isn’t this, to varying degrees, something that happens at almost every startup, not so different from Theranos?”
It’s just that nobody else raised as much money as Theranos, got as much media attention as Theranos, had as many big names involved as Theranos, or got as mired in litigation as Theranos. That’s really the only difference.
Let me write down a few things that struck me.
“Bluffing”
For early-stage startups, raising money with a bit of bluffing has become such common practice it’s almost an accepted bad habit. No — actually it can’t be called purely bad. That’s because there are “few, but certainly some” people who actually turn that bluff into reality and make it add up in the end. It’s hard to deny that investors are playing a game of chicken knowing this full well. But that’s a game with its own aesthetic, played between “professional entrepreneurs” and “professional investors.” When amateurs on both sides try it, it’s nothing but fraud.
“The shareholder whose connection you can’t quite place”
Look at any shareholder list and there’s usually one or two names whose connection to the company isn’t entirely clear. That in itself is fine. It’s perfectly natural for someone to feel, “I don’t really understand the business, but I’ll support it with some funding!” But if that one or two names turn out to be big names everyone recognizes, the story changes considerably. That’s because “once one big name bites, it becomes easier to raise money after that.” In Theranos’s case, truly major figures were already on the shareholder list from an early stage. Even if all they did was “support a young entrepreneur with a bit of spare investment capital,” anyone looking at that shareholder list ends up assuming, on their own, “If this is a business that Mr./Ms. So-and-so is backing responsibly, then what she (Elizabeth) is saying must be true.” In fact, I suspect that even professional venture capitalists rarely conduct complete, rigorous due diligence entirely on their own. This is even more true for tech ventures. They build their DD around someone’s advice, past data, or some other clue. In such cases, the “name” on the existing shareholder list, or of the lead investor running that funding round, can become a source of misleading impressions.
“The executive doesn’t listen to a capable subordinate, but listens to some famous rich person instead”
A subordinate may be a specialist in their field, but they are not the executive. Especially scientists and engineers with little business experience can’t deny their naivety about politics and money. A famous rich person, on the other hand, usually became rich for a reason. They’re versed in both business and politics, and sharp about profit. An executive can’t help but sometimes think of a subordinate, “(this person doesn’t see the big picture).” In such moments, it’s unfortunately common for the executive to instead be swayed by the opinion of a third party who only ever sees the bird’s-eye view. But the subordinate doesn’t know that third party, doesn’t respect them, and certainly doesn’t rely on them. If you get the sense that the person at the top of your own organization isn’t looking your way, but is instead taking orders from something or someone out there, your heart naturally drifts away.
“Fragmentation of information”
Theranos certainly took on an unprecedented, groundbreaking challenge, and given how much money and how many excellent people they gathered, many people probably thought, “shouldn’t they have gotten at least a little closer to pulling it off?” (In reality, their testing device was nowhere near functional.) With more than $1.4 billion in funding, more than 600 employees, and nearly a decade of time, it almost seems like any great invention should have been possible. But reading the book, I came to think that one reason they couldn’t pull it off was the thorough fragmentation of information. It’s common practice to disclose highly confidential technology or features to only a handful of people. Apparently even at Apple it was common knowledge that “if you want to know the product specs, ask Steve Jobs or Jony Ive — the rest of us aren’t told anyway.” But if you build a structure where no department can coordinate horizontally with any other, there’s no way development can function. Each individual member was probably thinking something like, “well, I’m getting paid decently, so I’ll just handle what’s in front of me.” As a result, even when it came to building a system that was completely useless, everyone’s attitude was probably “don’t care,” “not interested,” or “I don’t really get the big picture anyway.”
Americans and division of labor
I’ve noticed that Americans like dividing up labor. Probably because clearly defining your own area of responsibility makes clear your accountability, your performance review, the skills you need, and your task status — which in turn secures your personal time. This always carries the risk that the team stops functioning organically as a team, and Andy Grove, for instance, pointed this out forcefully during the period when Japanese semiconductors were threatening the US. (Even so, it persists as a culture.)
“The top doesn’t understand the current state of things, or won’t try to”
There are organizations that function fine even with the horizontal connections cut off. Those are centralized organizations. They work if the person at the top is capable — though it’s hard going. But, for example, when a tech company’s top executive is a non-engineer, the existence of a close aide (often a CTO) becomes crucial. If that aide is sound and has a solid relationship of trust with the top, this problem can be adequately compensated for. But if it turns out that “the top doesn’t understand the current state,” “the aide doesn’t understand it either,” and “neither the top nor the aide is sound” — then there’s nothing left to be done. It’s hopeless.
“Promises made somewhere along the way”
Many people probably have experience of being rushed on a schedule that was never in any milestone plan. At companies where the executive also handles sales, it happens that they “go and make promises somewhere on their own.” It’s the result of them being desperate to seize a business opportunity, so you can’t be too hard on them for it. Ideally, that information should be shared with the team. Then the team would reluctantly accept it. But if it isn’t shared, trust is damaged. Employees are not slaves.
“Cronyism among executives”
Trust is important when selecting executives. That’s true at any company. But that trust should be used in a way that “doesn’t shy away from clashing opinions.” At Theranos, the COO was Elizabeth’s boyfriend, and the executives included her brother — who had no real operational experience — and his friends, with no selection process aimed at productively building anything up. And the board of directors, which should have functioned as an “older brother” or “father figure,” was likewise packed with members who had personal relationships with Elizabeth, and for a long time she held more than 90% of the voting rights. This is an extremely tragic situation.
“People valued purely for their academic credentials, with thin practical experience”
A degree is a pretty useful weapon. In fact, pitch decks at Silicon Valley startups usually feature, to a surprising degree, nothing but names of people from prestigious universities. But everyone knows this isn’t really what matters. Everyone knows it, and yet somehow the custom never dies out — perhaps a kind of unspoken deference. Academic credentials are useful, but they’re nothing more than a bluff. For instance, a well-known academic-credential hack in Japan is: “if you want the prestige of a University of Tokyo degree, get in through graduate school.” Your undergraduate grades, your papers, and an interview are enough to be properly evaluated. Your odds are far better than with a one-shot entrance exam.
“Generous pay for decorative consultants”
It’s rare, but not unheard of, for someone outside the executive ranks to see a company’s accounting records. Among the names in the payment history, there’s a certain individual. Google them, and it turns out they’re a very major figure, or at least a well-known fixer. And yet you’ve never heard their name mentioned inside the company, and you have no idea what their role is. Press around a bit, and you get answers like: “We’re getting advice on such-and-such,” or, “Wait, didn’t that only come up very recently? (But it says here we’ve been paying them for a year…)” In short, they’re purely decorative — and the day you discover that money enough to hire several engineers has been flowing to someone like that, it’s genuinely dispiriting.
“The employee who suddenly vanishes”
At companies with tight security, it happens that a departing employee announces their resignation, or is told they’re being let go, in a meeting room, and then leaves the building without ever returning to their desk. The general reasoning is to prevent the risk of confidential information being taken or leaked if they went back to a regular desk afterward. But beyond that general reasoning, I suspect that in practice, not a few cases are really about preventing the negative fallout of a resignation that wasn’t amicable — things like “making sure they don’t badmouth the company to people around them,” or “making sure that, since it’s a forced dismissal, they don’t retaliate in some way.” When a departing employee vanishes abruptly without even saying goodbye to the colleagues around them, despite there being no actual risk involved, it’s almost always this pattern. It’s a sign of a bad company.
“Want to buy back the stock of the company you’re leaving?”
This is an extremely serious matter, but generally speaking, when a company takes action to oust an executive who holds shares, the company will fight tooth and nail to get those shares back. In other words, this too is a case of a non-amicable departure, so from the executive’s standpoint, having an outside shareholder who might harbor a personal grudge is something that keeps them up at night, even if it’s only a small stake. But from the perspective of the person who was ousted, it’s only natural to think, “Why should I have to go along with your demands on top of being forced out?” Even so, there are no shortage of cases where the company moves aggressively to reclaim the shares, wielding contracts or resorting to legal action. At Theranos, a veteran named Avie — who had served as a close aide to Jobs at both NeXT and Apple — suffered this fate, and when he consulted a lawyer, he was told, in essence: “Do you think this company has a future? Is this stock worth holding onto, worth the trouble?” Surely most people, hearing that, would feel they have no attachment left to it. And in fact, that’s exactly what Avie did.
“Say the right thing, and you get pushed out”
The section about Ian is genuinely heavy to read. An experienced veteran scientist raised concerns about the performance of Theranos’s testing device, was branded “uncooperative,” sidelined, fell into depression, and then… that’s the story. Capable scientists and engineers tend to be good at saying “the right thing.” That’s practically a mystery of life itself — consistent across every country. At many early-stage startups, the gap between “the grand vision” and “the feeble reality” is enormous. Everyone knows this. And yet people keep pushing forward anyway, carried by enthusiasm. No looking back, no hesitating. Just keep moving forward. In that kind of environment, criticism that pulls out “the right thing to say” is naturally unwelcome. A clear-headed executive should be able to make an appropriate judgment call — something like “I appreciate the feedback, but I’m choosing to proceed anyway,” or “let’s think of a workaround and keep going,” or “we can’t cross this particular line, so we’re stopping here.” But at a company or under an executive already in a bad spot, that kind of feedback gets ignored, trampled on, or shoved aside as if it never happened, and things move forward regardless. Of course, what capable scientists and engineers say isn’t infallible either. There are startups whose predictions were wrong and that nonetheless went on to great success. But in most cases, the outcome is simply “someone falls, without learning a thing, into a pitfall someone else has already fallen into before.”
“Winning one undeserved award after another”
As I’ve written in another note, it often takes several years before the full extent of trouble at a company in deep trouble actually becomes public. Theranos was no exception, and if anything, that’s true of most such companies. So even if a company is harboring some major, fatal flaw, it can keep being “today’s hottest startup” for however long it has left. Of course, winning an award is an honor. You should take seriously the expectations of the people who chose you, and your stakeholders are surely delighted too. But continuing to receive honors you don’t deserve creates a different kind of harm. Namely: “you yourself lose track of where you actually stand.” That alone is an extremely serious, potentially fatal affliction.
Originally published in Japanese at https://clazytech.com/2021/03/399/. Translated with LLM assistance and reviewed before publication.