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Password-protected ZIP files should be eliminated

The information processing society’s bulletin ran a feature on this topic recently, and that coincided with a string of exchanges I had with a certain major corporation involving the familiar

– send a password-protected ZIP as .zi_ – follow up with the password in a separate email

process, which caused all kinds of trouble (we barely even use email anymore anyway). The exhaustion of going through so much hassle just to receive what amounted to a few kilobytes of data lined up with the timing perfectly.

Plenty of people have already written about why password-protected ZIPs are harmful, so this will feel a bit stale, but I want to lay it out simply enough that anyone can follow.

Here’s the concise version of why it’s pointless:

anyone who can intercept the attachment can also intercept the follow-up email containing the password.

That’s the whole argument. Five seconds of thought gets you there. My second-grader could probably work it out.

Granted, there’s some effect in the rare case where only one of the two emails happens to leak for some reason (a misdirected send, say), but that isn’t a security measure in any real sense. The business process itself needs rethinking.

Now, as concisely as possible, here’s why it’s actively harmful.

– It gets waved through virus scans

The standard practice with password-protected ZIPs is to change the file extension — not .zip but .zi_ or .a or something similar. These attachments then frequently sail through virus checks. But “sailing through” doesn’t mean “no virus was found” — it means “we couldn’t figure out what this was, so absolutely do not open it!!!” And yet people open it anyway, because it’s an email from a business partner.

Incidentally, spoofing a sender address is basic-level stuff for anyone with bad intentions.

In other words, declaring “we send things as password-protected ZIPs” is practically the same as saying “we’re going to render your company’s security measures meaningless, sorry about that (teehee).” I doubt the people doing this see it that way.

– It can’t be opened on mobile

As mentioned, password-protected ZIPs usually come with altered file extensions. That means mobile devices mostly can’t decompress them, even if you know the password. Checking email on mobile while out and about is, for today’s working professionals, basically a productivity booster. Deliberately undercutting that is a shabby thing to do.

– It’s just depressing

It makes you feel the harshness of the world.

I can picture the scene: the company’s security staff knew ages ago that this was pointless, but they grudgingly keep running it anyway, muttering things like “it’s hard to change a system that’s already in place” or “because the higher-ups told us to.” It makes the irrationality of it all sink in.

Let me also talk about why password-protected ZIPs are thought to be a good idea. Plenty of people have adopted them, so there must be some shred of reasoning behind it.

For instance:

– having a “password entry” step prevents files from being opened carelessly

The logic goes: if you send to the wrong recipient, they’ll think “huh? From so-and-so? What’s this file? Oh, it’s password-protected,” which buys enough time for you to follow up with “sorry, I sent that by mistake, please delete the earlier file!”

But honestly — just be careful in the first place.

And in practice, it’s rare to find a setup where “only special emails get password protection.” Almost everywhere, every single email gets turned into a password-protected ZIP. In that case, everyone just enters the password and opens the file without thinking twice.

There are plenty of more realistic countermeasures against misdirected sends, so this is a weak justification for bothering with password-protected ZIPs at all.

Another example:

– sending the password through a separate channel functions as a security measure

That’s true as far as it goes. But how many people are actually doing that?

Some companies use an “automatic ZIP-password system,” where the password is of course sent in a follow-up email anyway.

And even if someone skips such a system and manually creates a password-protected ZIP, then follows up saying “the password is your company’s name,” anyone who’s hacked their way to the file obviously knows that too. Something like “it’s your birthday” raises the bar slightly, but it’s not beyond finding out. (Also, who even knows their business contact’s birthday.) And reading out something like “the password for that attachment is aXg2JGsGEsxhhjlesSO” over the phone is a nightmare from an operational standpoint.

The only approach that seems like it would actually work is mailing each other a cipher table in advance and conveying the password according to that, then changing the cipher table irregularly. Sounds like something the FBI or MI6 might do? Ha.

Also, offline password cracking can always be done, given enough time and determination.

So taken on its own, the password-protected ZIP itself has almost no practical value.

Also — and I haven’t witnessed this directly —

– there’s apparently a mistaken belief that “adopting password-protected ZIPs is mandatory to obtain Privacy Mark certification”

This seems to be a myth. I regularly exchange files with Privacy Mark-certified companies, and I don’t recall password-protected ZIPs ever coming up.

I won’t answer the question “so what are we supposed to do if you take away our trusted sword, the password-protected ZIP?” here. I’m not a security expert. I’ll leave that to the people who make their living at it.

That said, if anyone wants to hear my own personal take, I’m happy to offer it separately — strictly as unofficial advice. Ha.


Originally published in Japanese at https://clazytech.com/2020/06/360/. Translated with LLM assistance and reviewed before publication.