Fleeing Is Not Even Shameful. It Is the Wise Move
Have you heard of the term “Mississippi Company”? It refers to one of the largest bubbles in history, which occurred in 18th-century France. I’ll leave the detailed explanation to specialist books, but here’s a summary brief enough to follow the argument.
The French economy was in decline in the early 18th century, a result of the extravagant spending of the late Louis XIV. The regent (the de facto supreme power) and the people around him worried about this, but they were mediocre, and none of them could find much of a solution. That’s when the Scotsman John Law appeared. He had a brilliant mathematical mind but a poor sense of ethics, had built a fortune through gambling, and had been exiled from his homeland after killing a man in a dispute over drink and women. But a genius is still a genius. Law succeeded brilliantly in ingratiating himself with the regent, and economic policy came to be conducted along the lines he proposed. Drawing on his natural intelligence and the broad financial knowledge he’d picked up while wandering through various countries, Law engineered a dramatic recovery in the French economy for a time, and made a fortune along with it.
It was around then that Law conceived the Mississippi Company. He drew up a plan to develop the gold mines around the Mississippi, then French territory, and acquired control of the Mississippi Company.
As the company belonged to Law, who was by then a hero of the business world, the Mississippi Company’s share price soared. Law issued additional shares, but demand to buy them was so overwhelming that currency itself ran short. So the regent issued additional banknotes, which pushed the share price up again, prompting further issuance, and then again, and again — the volume of currency in circulation ballooned to several times, then dozens of times, the size of the real economy. (This was still the era of the gold standard, and Law himself surely understood very well the risk of a bank run.)
During that frenzied period, nobles and stockbrokers seeking rights to purchase new Mississippi Company shares swarmed to Law’s residence, forming long lines. People pitched tents nearby hoping to get the latest information, to the point where Law was forced to move house repeatedly. Trading in shares became lively, related businesses were energized, and Paris’s economy appeared, on the surface, to flourish. Workers’ wages rose several times over, and rents soared. But public order worsened, and even high-ranking nobles and clergy, desperate to get shares, turned to criminal acts.
The unraveling finally began when a certain duke, out of spite at not being given rights to new shares, sold off all his holdings.
Gradually, brokers with sharp instincts, and the nobles they influenced, began to think, “There’s no way this can go on forever.” They sold off their shares little by little and moved their assets abroad. This caused domestic economic activity to stagnate further, widened the gap with the real economy, led to a coin shortage and a loss of confidence in paper money, and ultimately the scheme collapsed. The share price fell sharply as a result. (In the meantime, the Mississippi Company’s actual business had achieved essentially nothing — it had, after all, been a company sold off cheap precisely because results were hard to come by.)
Law fled the country, saddled with enormous debts. The regent later testified in the subsequent trial in a way that placed nearly all the blame on Law, creating a villain for the history books, and the affair came to an end. But the turmoil in the French economy ran deep and persisted, and incidents causing many deaths continued afterward. (I won’t go into detail here, since it strays from the theme.)
Hmm. It’s a slight variation on a story we’ve heard somewhere before.
Historic disasters tend to closely resemble some other historic disaster we’ve heard of before.
So what’s the lesson in a situation like this? What’s the iron rule? Simply put: run.
Surely there were people who watched this classic kind of bubble with a cool, detached eye. But a bubble like this runs its course all the way to the end before it bursts. Which means the damage spreads indiscriminately to everyone around it.
Take the Mississippi Company affair as an example: faced with the coin shortage, the regent first carried out several devaluations of coinage, then imposed limits on how much coin one could hold, and ultimately issued a decree banning the use of coin altogether. In other words, even the wealth of the wise people who had simply stood by and watched shrank dramatically.
So in this case, the correct answer was: “move your assets abroad and get out, fast.”
Of course, in a bubble like this, there were surely plenty of people who made enormous profits and pulled off a clean escape. And even short of a windfall, many of the French laborers sent to America as workers for the Mississippi Company never once set foot in the gold mines, and simply vanished off to other American states.
Watching quietly is not enough. You have to avoid it. The moment you spot a situation that’s clearly “off,” put as much distance as you can between yourself and it.
Running away isn’t even shameful. It’s actually the best strategy.
The internet bubble (the dot-com bubble) happened a long, long time ago, in both America and Japan. During that period, a handful of specific businesses boomed. One of them, I think, was something like “outsourced website creation.” Back when many companies still didn’t have websites, an engineer who could nimbly type out HTML tags had value. If you could write style sheets, you had even more value. If you could wield Perl, you were fought over. Several companies generated enormous profits during that period, but the ones who truly came out on top were, again, the ones who judged the peak correctly and got out at the right moment.
As you know, the work of writing HTML tags soon vanished from the market and became worthless. But since websites themselves still remained, the market came to demand “added value” instead. Even so, added value is a genuinely difficult thing, and not something anyone can easily conjure up. Customer needs also vary enormously. On top of that, the market itself was shrinking as prices fell.
Fighting over the diverse needs scattered across a shrinking market reeks of a death game. The people who sensed that cleverly got out fast. That truly is the best strategy.
The dot-com bubble is, of course, usually discussed in terms of the stock market, but doing so here would just repeat what’s already been said about other incidents (foolish history repeats itself!), so I’ve deliberately avoided that angle.
Now, what about the subprime loan crisis? Surely everyone involved in the securities market at the time was affected. So the correct answer there was probably to withdraw from the securities market entirely. If you’d converted your assets into things with low volatility, like gold or real estate, you could have made a killing buying stocks at the bottom once they’d fully crashed. (I didn’t do this.)
On a somewhat smaller scale, companies where “wrong practices” have become the norm carry the same kind of warning signs. If such a company is large, or happens to be popular, or has a good external reputation, the fallout when it bursts is correspondingly large. Wrong practices mean things like: people with no track record getting promoted, employees with clearly unethical behavior (or the behavior itself) being left unaddressed, and the mechanisms meant to police these things not functioning properly. And a situation where the company is filled with employees who harbor no doubts whatsoever about any of it. The right move is to flee a company like that. It’s the best strategy.
That said, the timing is always the hard part to judge.
Even in the Mississippi Company affair, there must have been a fair number of shrewd people who made some profit and then got out. The same goes for the internet bubble, and even the subprime crisis (that was also the period when “star trader” salaries on Wall Street became limitless).
Everyone wants to win nicely and then get out nicely.
Unfortunately, few people in this world manage to pull that off. They’re not ordinary people.
Ordinary people tend to think, once they’re in profit, “I can probably squeeze out a bit more,” and even once things start falling, they tend to think, “It’ll surely bounce back soon” (a cognitive bias). Anyone who can make the cold, correct call at that point earns a proper profit. But usually, it’s not that simple.
In fact, in the Mississippi Company affair, the regent at a certain point banned taking assets abroad, and also banned exchanging banknotes for precious metals. Checkmate. How many people could have accurately read that timing? Most of the people who came out ahead simply fled, all-out, the instant they personally felt “this is bad” — that was all there was to it. This is an extremely precarious tightrope to walk.
The same can be said of the “South Sea Bubble,” which occurred in England at almost exactly the same time as the Mississippi Company affair. The South Sea Company was a copycat enterprise built on almost exactly the same fraudulent scheme as the Mississippi Company, and the overheated stock market it created saw a flood of “bubble companies” (companies with barely any real business, raising huge sums on the promise of big dividends, intending to vanish before long) springing up like mushrooms after rain, bringing massive turmoil to the stock market. Even then, “most ladies and gentlemen never believed these dubious companies’ businesses would actually succeed, and were only thinking about which fool they could unload their shares on at the highest possible price the next time the stock rose” — so risky was this game of chicken, as it was later recalled. (Apparently one of them was even “a company that mail-orders perpetual motion machines,” so if that isn’t madness, what is?)
A more recent example that can be called similar is the excessive proliferation of altcoins (shall we say, the ragtag non-mainstream fringe of cryptocurrency) from late 2017 into early 2018. There were surely people who sold cleverly and made a profit there, but accurately reading the timing of a rise and fall in something that might sit at $0.01 today and hit several hundred dollars tomorrow can only be called a superhuman feat (well, or most of it was probably manipulation by insider rings).
Ah, writing about ICO scams would make this even longer, so I’ll pass on that here.
Getting involved in this kind of thing risks throwing away your precious money, or if you’re running your own business, your time, down the drain. So for an ordinary person, the correct answer is simply “don’t get on board in the first place.” Don’t be greedy. By the time most people start thinking, “maybe this could actually work out…,” most bubbles are already close to their peak. Without exceptional foresight or sheer luck, it’s nearly impossible to catch a big wave from the very start. And the profit you can extract from a wave that’s already underway is limited anyway. So it’s better to give up on greedy ambitions and put distance between yourself and it, fast.
In exactly this kind of situation, running away isn’t shameful at all — it must be the best strategy. When you spot something “off” right in front of you, move quickly and boldly, no matter what. This can probably be stated as a truth without reservation.
Originally published in Japanese at https://clazytech.com/2020/02/328/. Translated with LLM assistance and reviewed before publication.