Startup spirit clicks into place through risk assessment versus management
Some people treat risk assessment and risk management as if they were the same thing, but the meanings differ.
Let me state it textbook-style for now.
Risk assessment, true to “assess,” is about recognizing risk itself from past experience and the know-how of wise people, then quantifying it and turning it into an asset. Risk management is “managing” that.
In other words, assessment comes first, and management follows.
I should mention this, since I skipped over it: risk generally refers to trouble, accidents, or other damage that a released product might cause. Here I’d like you to take it as a somewhat extended, more abstract concept, which I think brings you closer to real understanding.
If the evaluation in the assessment is lax, management won’t function. Assessment is normally measured as frequency of occurrence multiplied by severity, but if you think “the probability of occurrence is extremely low, so it should be fine,” and it turns out there was actually a reasonable chance of it happening with some frequency, controlling the resulting damage becomes extremely difficult. Conversely, even if the assessment itself is appropriate, management can still fail through optimistic thinking — for instance, assuming “a defect rate up to 5% can be handled by the existing customer support staff,” and then watching individual cases take more effort than expected. The team falls behind on customer response and ends up causing major confusion in the market.
Up to this point, this has just been trivia-level knowledge about quality control, but I find it gets surprisingly interesting when applied to running a startup.
Let’s try applying it negatively, as an experiment.
A startup is an organization where both assessment and management are sloppy. Members are inexperienced and lack planning, they’re always improvising, and they think that as long as they can respond to things immediately, that’s good enough. The quality of the product they can offer customers is low to begin with, but they replace that with the convenient phrase “a growth opportunity” and ultimately make the customer put up with it. So except for the rare lucky ones who succeed, most end up a mess and vanish from the market. All of that comes from underestimating risk from the start.
Something like that. I was impressed at how thoroughly I managed to trash my own corner of the world, given that I’m in the startup scene myself. (laughs)
Certainly, seen from outside, there’s nothing to be done about being told that — and even from inside, I won’t deny that quite a few startups leave you thinking “well, I guess that’s fair.” But I think there’s also something like pride, or a philosophy, to be found in that very fact.
A startup is a peculiar kind of organization that looks at the assessment’s evaluation axis as if it were on a logarithmic scale, and builds a “growth allowance” into its management.
Let me walk through this in order.
First, the logarithmic scale. I’ll leave the details to Wikipedia or Google, but put simply, on a log scale, things that look like big numbers aren’t actually all that large in real terms. That’s simply a mechanism of the log axis: “the gap between 10 and 100” and “the gap between 100 and 1000” appear to be roughly the same distance.
“You’re not going to fool us with that.”
That mindset is the particular way a startup’s screws come loose. As a result, only “things that stand out as high risk” draw attention — either the frequency of occurrence is extremely high, or the severity is extremely high, or both. Things with moderate frequency and moderate severity get relatively little attention.
When you think about how to lead business and technology within limited assets — time and money — it’s entirely understandable, once you’ve actually been put in that position, that you’d end up with this conclusion. The CEO of Dropbox reportedly said: “If you want to survive as a startup, be prepared to say no to 93% of things.” I think that points at the same kind of thing.
Next, the “growth allowance.” Put simply, this means conducting management very optimistically, but instead of letting that optimism work through thoughts like “it probably won’t happen anyway” or “if it happens, we’ll manage somehow,” you let it work as optimism for thinking things like “we’ll have a sufficient structure in place by launch” or “we’ll strengthen hiring as soon as the next funding round closes” — in short, “we are capable of responding to the future.” This naturally sits badly with an organization running on ordinary logic. In something like ISO 9001, which strictly and usefully defines quality control processes, “planning” is emphasized, and securing a structure along with oversight and record-keeping by a responsible person from the earliest stage are presented as very important matters. I very much agree with all of this, too. But in a startup, this kind of risk-taking is considered acceptable, and against the mountain of precarious management issues to juggle, a topic like this is merely a minor point.
So the startup way is to control risk by building in a “growth allowance” and making “bold choices about what to keep and what to cut.”
Naturally, when the bet misses, that’s the end of it. It will likely fall apart in ruins. That’s what taking a risk means. And that “pitfall discovered” becomes a foundation for those who were watching nearby, and for your own future.
The spirit of a startup is to accept being part of a massive experimental ecosystem and a shared fiction (membership free), and to pour one’s personal risk into its advancement.
Originally published in Japanese at https://clazytech.com/2019/10/271/. Translated with LLM assistance and reviewed before publication.