Clay Tech

"clay-works make things real"

translated from clazytech.com

Feigenbaum Says Startup Zones Can Revive Japan's Economy

This article was originally written in January 2014 on the old blog mixture-art.net and has been moved here. The style and information are left as they were at the time.

I read a book recommended to me by a VC friend I met in Silicon Valley.

“Revive the Japanese Economy Through Startup Special Zones!”

It’s an old book published in 2002, but it lays out, with great clarity, what I’ve been experiencing firsthand, in real time. At the same time, it makes clear that Japan hasn’t changed since then — or really, for much longer than that. I learned a lot from the other details as well, so I’ll first summarize the book’s contents, then give my own feedback on it.

Incidentally, you can read it for free at the link below. http://davidjamesbrunner.org/wp-content/uploads/entrepreneur-j.pdf

For the profile of the author, Edward Feigenbaum, see here: http://ja.wikipedia.org/wiki/エドワード・ファイゲンバウム

////////////////////////////////////////////////////// (Summary section) //////////////////////////////////////////////////////

The “Bye Bye Buy” Strategy (Small and Medium Enterprise Law)

This is the idea of government support through aggressive “purchasing” of products from emerging companies. Japan does exactly the opposite in the field of computer systems. The government orders its own systems from large established companies and pours enormous investment into them. In effect, government policy directs young Japanese workers into “maintenance work on things that are already mature.” In the US, by law, a certain percentage of government system investment is open only to small and medium-sized companies for bidding. And yet, seen from the “end customer” perspective, Japanese people’s motivation toward “early adoption” is famously high worldwide. In other words, plenty of people love new things. But the moment they join an organization, that flips completely. The mid-career hiring market isn’t fluid, lifetime employment is the mainstream, and internal promotion is the one path to success in that kind of organizational culture. So it’s only natural that an atmosphere takes hold where not a single failure is tolerated, and judgment inevitably turns slow and passive. I’ve laid these out as if they were separate, but in reality they’re tightly interlinked — it’s a chicken-and-egg situation at this point. Still, the delay in IT system adoption by Japanese companies and government has undoubtedly come from this conservative stance.

Low-Risk, Low-Return Startups

These are startups that exist within the established sector (an already-established market). They merely do something slightly new, lack entrepreneurial spirit, and contribute nothing to economic growth.

“Pushed Out” versus “Pulled In”

Entrepreneurial motivation differs greatly between Japan and the US. In Japan, people who have grown tired of large companies are “pushed out” into starting businesses. In the US, people possessed by the idea of realizing a new technology or idea are “pulled in” to start businesses.

Middle Management

Japanese companies often turn to subcontracting to secure early profits, and in that case there’s no need for middle management (cost cutting). Company growth is slow and it contributes nothing to the social economy, but it does play the role of a “small oasis.”

Middle management is a major key to growth. Standout companies that achieve breakthrough growth always have excellent, professional middle management, paid well and working with high motivation. That frees the leadership to focus on business direction and capital planning without being pulled this way and that by every small problem.

The absence of middle management is proof that the business consists of a single, small-scale function’s development or service. Such a company has little room to develop, and as it stands it’s hard to expect major growth from it.

Without a Clear Exit Strategy, VCs Can’t Invest

A clear example: “We will exceed $280 million in sales within five years and go public.” (Exceeding $140 million in sales within five years is one investment benchmark.) An exit is almost always either an M&A or an IPO, but of these, M&A doesn’t work well in Japan. An M&A is where an entrepreneur hands over control of the company in exchange for a success reward, but in Japan this looks like “defeat.” In the US, normally, after the second or third round of funding, the founder typically becomes nothing more than “one of the minority shareholders.” They retain management authority but can be fired depending on the wishes of the major shareholders. Quite a few founder-CEOs in Japan refuse VC investment because they dislike that.

Japanese companies are also bad at horizontal integration, and as a result, bad at M&A too.

Ecosystem

In America there’s a sense of “we all share the risk and the return together.” The VC is the prime example of this, but it extends to small individual investors and customers too. There’s the sweetness of sharing in the return, and also the support that keeps brave entrepreneurs from being destroyed.

Surprisingly, stock options were not legally recognized in Japan until 1999. And in the event of bankruptcy, banks and the like could seize personal assets on the grounds of loans, destroying individuals.

On the other hand, Japan’s R&D spending as a share of GDP is among the highest in the world. There’s no question it’s an R&D powerhouse. In other words, a great deal of innovation should be lying dormant there.

Risk

The NIMBY (Not In My Backyard) spirit. There are plenty of specialists in avoiding risk, but none at all in managing it.

Custom

Part of the background to the difficulty Japanese startups face in securing talent is that stock options weren’t effective, but the larger factor is things like the custom of parents wanting their children to land jobs at stable companies.

There’s also the general sense that M&A means defeat, along with a history of companies raising funds from financial institutions that demand relatively quick profits. Various barriers to startup growth exist within Japan itself.

////////////////////////////////////////////////////// (Impressions and feedback section) //////////////////////////////////////////////////////

The Need to Bring in Other Executives and Outside Directors from the Early Stage

I’m not someone who studied management as a specialty and built up skills in it. I’m not entirely without that kind of brain, of course, but trying to work out funding plans and growth strategy while simultaneously thinking through detailed technical solutions and pushing them forward is simply unreasonable. The two can even conflict at times, and in that case, isn’t it obviously arrogant to claim you can make a comprehensive judgment from both positions by yourself?

Even if you start out on a very small scale (say, just yourself), you need at least one person from outside the company who can speak objectively into your management. That’s partly about securing credibility with VCs, but it’s also about the resolve to make the company “not just your own” from the start — the groundwork for an exit.

Risk Management

I honestly don’t fully understand “risk management” myself (I’ve never been trained in it), but the point made through the example of nuclear power plants became reality with the Fukushima incident, and I think it hit the mark painfully precisely. The power plant itself can be seen as a failure following an ambitious challenge, and if asked, management would surely have said “there’s no risk” — because they wanted to do it. The public shared in that risk and return, so acting like a victim now just because a negative return came isn’t right.

Saying this openly would probably get me attacked hard, so I won’t go too deep into it, but this might be one facet that reveals something about the Japanese character.

Not being used to taking risks, and not knowing how to bring things under control once they’ve gone wrong.

Taking risks itself isn’t a bad thing. Reckless risk is clearly bad, but any challenge carries some risk with it. That’s perfectly normal, and deciding “if there’s risk, avoid it” is clearly too hasty. If the risk is simply too large, that’s a different story, but ordinarily what matters is managing that risk, weighing it against the return, and taking avoidance action or hedging.

What I want to say here isn’t about the Fukushima issue — I want to shift the spotlight onto the Japanese character.

When companies make business decisions, they turn extremely cautious and passive. I think many Japanese people sense this. Self-serving convenience and passing the buck around are both everyday scenes woven into the life of the Japanese salaryman. Toward what the government does, by contrast, there’s something more like optimism, an attitude of unconditional acceptance from the start. This is a strikingly unbalanced standard of judgment.

On one hand, passive and cautious — in a sense clever — and on the other, falling into defenseless foolishness. Both are matters of group behavior, so it’s probably not a question of group psychology as such.

Suppose a given decision turns out to be a failure. A passive decision paired with criticism after failure is, broadly speaking, a reasonable combination. If you deliberated over and over, took your time, and passively cut risk as much as possible, then that was probably a decision with no risk left in it. If it fails even then, that deserves criticism. But what should go together with unconditional acceptance is “well, failure was unavoidable.” After all, there was no real deliberation — things were just swept along. There was no measuring of risk, no insurance set up for it, so of course whatever happened, happened. Getting worked up and complaining about it now is nothing but fighting with bare fists against nothing.

This is where Japan’s poor risk management shows through. Too accustomed to passive decision-making, not accustomed to shouldering risk. So when risk is actually being shouldered, people don’t even notice it. Or perhaps they faintly notice it but look away, pretending they aren’t carrying it.

This was something often said during the period when Japanese football was struggling to progress: “Japanese players can’t take risks.” The criticism was that there were far too few aggressive attempts — committing to an overlapping run to unsettle the opponent, say, or trying a bold switch of play instead of relying only on short passes — which made Japan an easy opponent to play against.

But of course, if a goal is conceded following such an attempt, the player is instantly treated as the culprit…

…and that very way of thinking is itself a bad Japanese habit.

Professor Feigenbaum, and likewise coach Zaccheroni, were saying the same thing: “Japanese people fear failure, and sink too deep when they fail.”

In Silicon Valley, by contrast, people apparently say: “Someone who has gone bankrupt once is someone who confirmed the location of the pitfall for everyone else.”

Speaking from my own experience working in America, everyone there is frighteningly tough, resilient to setbacks, thick-skinned, and full of vitality. It’s astonishing.

Cutting-Edge Sector? Established Sector?

Will you change the times at the cutting edge, or push a bit harder within an existing market? This is extremely important when setting up a company, and in most cases there’s no chance to choose again.

If it’s the former, making a product isn’t necessarily the goal. Selling a product as a means of building a name is one valid approach, but once the technology is complete, an M&A works just as well. If it’s the latter, what you want is the result of sales, so a product or service is essential. Unless you land a solid hit, even managing to attract a bit of attention still leaves an acquisition or an IPO a distant dream.

If it’s the former, you have to go all in and push forward with everything — money and people alike — to produce results in the short term. You probably also have to think about assembling people with name recognition and status, anticipating the eventual sale. If it’s the latter, you should keep fixed costs down and run lean with a small elite team, to maintain a structure capable of turning a profit. Above all, it’s about the numbers — making something that sells but doesn’t turn a profit is out of the question.

With the latter, you run the company nervously, right on the edge of whether an exit strategy can be realized, but if things don’t go as hoped, you can still shift to safe, conservative management and simply keep the company alive for now. The former is “just go for it,” and then “if it fails, die with dignity.”

It’s all one package.

Receiving investment ⇨ Make the exit strategy clear ⇨ Recognize that the company will never be yours alone forever ⇨ Since it belongs to everyone, the risk gets distributed among everyone too ⇨ You can fail, and you can also start over ⇨ You can take a big swing ⇨ Because of that, winning big is possible, and since the gains get distributed, it also becomes a form of social contribution

Not receiving investment ⇨ No need for an exit strategy. If you can create employment on an ongoing basis, that’s fine too, and you can run things somewhat selfishly ⇨ You stay president forever ⇨ You bear nearly all the risk alone ⇨ You cannot afford to fail ⇨ You can’t take on especially bold challenges ⇨ Low risk, low return ⇨ If you do succeed, the profit might be small, but it’s almost entirely yours

The Japanese character suits the latter — durability over explosive power. As a Japanese person myself, I understand that extremely, extremely well. Honestly.


Originally published in Japanese at https://clazytech.com/2014/01/1990/. Translated with LLM assistance and reviewed before publication.